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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The Problem
i. Investigation and Evaluation of Idealistic Tenden-
cies in Some Recent Naturalism
G. K. Chesterton writes thus of the pervasive practical
implications of a philosophical point of view:
There are some people, and I am one of them, who think
that the most practical and import? nt thing about a
man ip still his view of the universe. We think that
for a J. landlady considering a lodger, it is important
to know his income, but still more important to know
his philosophy. We think that for a general about to
fight an enemy ^ it is important to know the enemy's
numbers, but it is still more important to know the
enemy's philosophy. We think the question is not
whether the theory of the cosmos affects matters, but
whether, in the long run, anything else affects them,-*-
E. S. Brightman describes the philosophical spirit as "the
thinking attitude" devoted to truth. Were it possible to
inculcate in all persons the steadfast intention thoughtful-
ly to seek truth in all situations, the lot of mankind would,
no doubt, be a far happier one, although probably still far
removed from unanimity of opinion as long as individual minds
1. Chesterton, Fer
. , 16.
la, Brightman, ITp7 18-20.

2are free to pursue individual trends of thought. Thi'ough
the ages, sincere men have been engaged in an earnest search
for truth, and have arrived at the diametrically opposed
conclusions of idealism and materialism.
The history of philosophy is a record of the breach be-
tween these two philosophical views, 'i'ssentially, their
di"'ferences have not changed since Plato seid that God is
the measure of all things, while Protagoras proclaimed man
as the measure of all things. For the one, God, in his love,
created the univervSe; for the other, physical nature is the
self-sufficient cause of all. For one, man, "a little lower
than the angels," has been endowed with an immortal soul; for
the other, mr-n, "of the earth, earthy," is composed of a few
cents' worth of chemicals, and v/ill vanish with the dissolu-
tion of his body. In one view, ^od has provided man with a
sense of right and wrong, and has given him a set of moral
laws for the guidance of his conduct; in the other, morality,
like fashion, may change with the season, and is a matter of
pleasure or utility or expediency. The view "that treats
personality seriously and sacredly has in it the seeds of
hope—hope that humanity DKiy see" that effective realization
is possible "only by the labors of reason and love, human
and divine. "-^^
lb. Brightman, W, 166.

3Until the twentieth century, the demarcation between
these two systems of thought was of chiseled precision, with
no slightest suggestion of a blurring of the cleavage, lifete-
rialism was the negation of idealism.
Recent naturalism, however, influenced by modern science,
seems inclined to a less rigid opposition. Tendrils of natu-
ralistic thought seem to be reaching toward idealism. It is
to these tendrils that this dissertation is devoted. Tenuous
though some of them may seem, nevertheless, they mark a de-
parture from an age-old position, and they may be the fore-
runners of deeper changes,
ii. Survey of the Literature
Inasmuch as recent naturalism is regarded as a distinc-
tively American system, research has been accordingly gov-
erned. The sources include books and articles from the pens
of both idealists and naturalists, and also dissertations
based on related studies,
John Dewey, as the founder of modern naturalism, and,
in the opinion of some, as the only American who has founded
a regular philosophic school, merits first attention. A-
mong his many philosophical publications, those particularly
valuable to this work include: The Influence of Darwin on
Ic, Infra
,
44,
Id. Infra , 46,

4"'^"hiloygophy ; Essays in Experimental Logic ; Creative Intelli -
gence ; Reconstruction in Philosophy ; Experience and Natur e
:
The Quest for Certainty ; A 6om!Tion Faith ; and Theory of Valu-
ation.
Dewey was influenced by his predecessors in the Prag-
matic movement- -Charles Peirce, who held that the real mean-
ing of an idea is the practical effect it vvill have in ac-
tion, and ".'illiam James, who, twenty years later, developed
Peirce 's view, Darwin's theory of evolution v/as also an
important factor in the formulation of Dev/ey's philosophy,
as was Francis Bacon's emphasis upon empirical observation
and analysis of observed data,
Dewey's influence has been world-wide, Ke has spent
time in Germany, England, France, Russia, -and two years
in China, His Reconstruction in Philosophy consists of
lectures delivered at the Imperial University in Tokyo,
As is usual with those of extensive influence, there
exists a variety of opinions regarding Dewey, He has en-
thusiastic defenders and bitter opponents. As the cen-
tral figure in the philosophical system treated in this
work, a brief consideration of a fem of these comments seems
indicated.
In an article in Mind, G, C. Field deplores Dewey's
unfair treatment of Aristotle, He writes;

6^j'/here he ^ewe\3 does mention e particular thinker
or Fchool of thought by name, he rarely does .jus-
tice to them, and in some cases simply misunder-
stands them. ... To .aj-istotle, indeed. Prof. Dew-
ev is consistently unfair throughout. He v/rites
of him as if Aristotle had vTitten nothing but the
second part of the Tenth Book of the Ethics, and
he betrays no appreciation of the fact that in re-
ality Aristotle shared and anticipated many of his
ovm most fundamental doctrines.
On the other hand, there are encomiums such as this by Kil-
patrick:
I see in Professor Dewey the modest sincerity of
Socrates, the radical constructive thinking of
Plato, the balanced outlook of Aristotle. Like
Socrates, he too has brought philosophy 6own from
the clouds to dv/ell among men. Like Plato, he
has married philosophy and education with like
fertile results. Like /iristotle, he ha.s medi-
ated conflicts, but less often by finding a "mean"
betvreen contending elements than by showing the
unreality of conflict and shifting the problem
to more fruitful lines.
In the Journal of Philosophy , W. K. Sheldon expresses
the opinion that Professor Dewey
is the democratic philosopher in the world of
American democracy, as Kegel was the aristocra-
tic philosopher in the world of Prussian aris-
tocracy, and he carries democracy to quite as
great an extreme as did Hegel his aristocracy.
4
2. Field, art. (1923).
3. Kilpatrick, art. (1923).
^. Sheldon, art. (1921).

Arthur Kenyon Rogers forms the follovdng estimate of
D ev'jey * s ph i1os ophy
:
It cannot be denied that in the interest of mak-
^'-^r^ ^11 judornents practical, and all objects of
knowledge iderls, Dewey has created a highly spec
ulative philosophy, whose practical value seems
at best only the negative one of clearing away
supposed mental obstacles to change and recon-
struction,^
H, '7ildon Carr finds that Dewey's "style is never lu-
cid or technical, and the meaning is often obscure," and
that "we cannot help feeling that Professor Dev/ey's doc-
trine draws much of its fascination from its being kept in
the background,"^ V/aldo Frank considers that "The lack of
organic wholeness brings an isolatedness to I\'!r, Dev/ey's
papres of philosophy, and makes it far easier to set them
down than to take them up." Fe accepts Dev;ey as a leader
of chilrihood, but not as a leader of raaturit3'", because
he cannot see men w^ole, because he fails to
find the nucleus of focus, of organization, of
timeless sub.ject-value, and of transformation
within the self. Re is himself a child of cha-
os, and his works are chaos.'''
Woodbridge reports that, in reply to a simple Question, such
as, "Surely the state before change begins cannot itself
5. Rogers, RAP, 393.
6. Carr, art. (1926).
7. Frank, art, (1928),

also change. Is there not something about the past that
never again changes?"
Dewey defined and distinguished and qualified,
in such a maze of dialectic, that not only did
I not get any ansv/er, I didn't even know v/here
my Question went to. And do you know, when he
^gets that way, he thinks he is being empirical,-^
Euch are some of the opinions regarding the personality,
v/hich, more than any other, has influenced recent natural-
istic thought. Regardless of individual Judgments concern-
ing him, all must concede that he is a force in his century.
Hoy Wood Sellars' system, which is particularly marked
by idealistic tendencies, has received considerable atten-
tion. Among his works especially to be noted in connection
with this study are: Critical Realism ; The Essentials of
Philosophy ; Evolut i onarv Nature li sm ; The "Philosophy of Phy-
sical Realism ; and The Principles and Problems of Philosophy .
Yervant R. Krikorian's volume, Feturalism and the Human
Spirit, a collection of essays by representative naturalists,
has provided a thoAoughgoinj? analysis from the naturalistic
viewpoint upon many of the perennial philosophical problems.
And Edgar S. Brightman's Nature and Values is described on
8. Costello, art. (19^^)

8the du?t-,iacket "an enswer to the program set forth in
the recent sjTnpoPium entitled Faturalism and the Huinan
Spirit . " Also to be mentioned at this point is Peter A.
Bertocci's "The Logic of Naturalistic Arguments Against
TheiE*ic Hypotheses," which is a reply to Sterling P. Lam-
precht's "Faturaliv^m end Religion," one of the essays in the
naturalistic "s^onposium,
"
Other naturalistic authors receiving consideration in-
clude PTenry ^"elson "ieman, i^ax Carl Otto, and Irwin Edman,
The idealistic position herein set forth is essentially
the view of Borden Parker Bownne and Edgar S, Brightman. Oth-
er idealistic sources include works of '7. E. Hocking, Kant,
Hegel, Berkeley, and Fegel.
Very special appreciation is due Dr. Arthur W, I^lunk for
his invaluable dissertation entitled Roy Wood Sellars' Criti-
c isms of Idealism , and also to Di*, Francis G, Enslej'- for his
dissertation, an exhaustive work entitled The Naturalistic
Interpretation of Kelip'ion by John "Oev/ey ,

CHAPTER II
miW TRAITS OF TRADITIONAL IDEALISM AND OF
TRADITIONAL mTERIALISM
1. Idealism
1. Brief Survey of the History
Since man first turned his attention to speculative
thought, he has been engaged in controversy about two con-
flicting world views. The fundamental rift concerns the na
ture of the feasal reality; for idealism, the ultimate real-
ity is mental; for the opposing view, materialism, it is
nonmental,
(1) Origin and Development of Idealism . Although the
term idealism first appeared during the latter part of the
17th century, it designates a philosophical position trace-
able to the dawn of thought. Long goes so far as to say
that
inasmuch as pure or Tuasic Materialism has "been an
infrequent doctrine among major thinkers, the his-
tory of philosophy broadly understood is largely
the history of Idealism.-^
Primitive animism, "the belief in mental agencies as
2
causing natural phenomena," marked man's first progress
1. Long, art. (19^2),
2. Hocking, TOP, 252,

toward philosophy, and likewise his initial step toward
Idealism, McDougall v^vites of the idealistic trend in man's
earliest search for ultimate causes:
It would seem that from a very remote period men of
almost all races ••ave entertained the "belief that
the living man differs from the corpse in that his
body contains some more suTntle thing or principle
which determines its purposive movements, its growth
and self-repair, and to which is due his capacity
for sensation, thought, and feeling. The lielief in
some such animating principle, or soul, is held toy
almost every existing race of men, no matter how
lowlv their grade of culture nor how limited their
mental powers; and we find evidences of a similar
belief among the earliest human records,^
Oriental philosophy, from its incipiency, has borne the
stamp of idealism. In India, intimations of advcnced theism
appear in the Rig Veda , and the early Upanlshads are ideal-
istic in character. Traditional Chinese metaphj^slcs rests
upon basic concepts of idealism. In Persia, Zarathustra
taught that Nature was controlled by Ahura I^fezda, the person-
alized spirit of Good, In Israel, during the period of the
written prophets, Jewish thought regarded the cosmic "I AM"
as "a personal and righteous World Ground who fashions and
controls both Nature and human history,"^
Many of the early Greek thinkers were idealists. There
3, McDougall, BM, 1,
^, Long, art, (19^2),

are idealistic leanings among- the Eleatics. Psrmenides, for
example, in his poem "On Truth," teaches that the sensible
world is one of appearance and illusion, and that logical
thought compels a conception of true reality as one change-
less "Being, Xenophanes, too, writes idealistically
:
There is one god, supreme among gods and men;
resembling mortals neither in form nor in mind.
The whole of hira sees, the whole of him thinks,
the whole of him hears.
Without toil he r"les all things by the power
of his mind.
Heraclitus says that "Man's own character is his daemon,"
and he conceives the Logos as the enduring rational princi-
ple in a universe of change.'^ Idealistic elements are found
in Anaxafforas* teaching. He introduced the Nous, Mnd, as
the force which arranges and guides the world. "Mind knows
all things," he said, and "mind also regulated all things."^
In the history of early Greek idealism, Socrates attained
the heights in his recognition of the soul or self as the
mainspring of all men*s actions;^ in his epphasis upon the
teleologicel principle and in his introduction of the
category of Value as of first importance both in Nature
5. Fishier, art.ClQ-^S).
6. Bakewell, SAP, 8.
7. Thilly, HOP, 25.
8. Bakewell, SAP, 52.
9. Zeller, OGP, 106.
10. Ibid .. Ill,
.Lt
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and in Man.-^-^
Plato was the first great ides list to attempt the for-
mulation of a comprehensive system. He "is a dualist or a
pluralist. The Receptacle (certainly) and the Pattern (prob-
ably) are external to God. ""^^ His idealism appears unmis-
takably in his opposition to materialism, in his insis-
tence upon the objectivity of value, and in his emphasis
upon the primacy of mind.-*-^ He teaches that
soul is prior to body, body secondary and deriva-
tive, soul governing in the real order of things
and body being subject to governance. . . , Soul,
then, by her own motions stirs all things in sky,
earth, or sea,-'-^
Aristotle continued the idealistic trend of Greek
thought, combining it with his naturalistic views. He held
that active reason is immaterial and eternal, and is found
in all rational creatures; that God is perfect rationality
or self-contemplating reason, and the "form of forms;" that
He is the Prime Mover viho causes the evolution of the world
without doing anything. His teleological metaphysic con-
sists in an eternal evolution, guided by purpose, from
11. Zeller, OGP, I08-IIO; Plato, Re£.
,
T, 334B,C.
12. Brlghtman, FOR, 339.
13. Plato, Rep .. X, 476A, 597B; VI, 608B.
14. Plato, Re2.
,
TV, 441C,D; IX, 583B,C; Phaedo, 64A-67B.
15. Plato, Rep.. IX, 617E, 619B; Laws
.
X, 904B.
16. Plato, Laws . X, 896C,

potentiality to actuality, '
St. Augustine taught that thought, and therefore the
thinker, is the most certain of all things. The theistlc
philosophy of St. Thomas Aouinas is strictly Aristotelian
and idealistic.
Idealistic leanings appear in the thought of various
philosophers of the seventeenth century, Descartes devel-
oped his system upon the theoretical premise of the concep-
tion of a God whose moral perfection will not permit Him to
deceive; hence, man is assured of the reality of the physi-
cal world revealed by his senses. From his hypothesis of
universal doubt, Descartes is led to the doctrine of the
conscious self. Because the act of doubting necessitates
8 doubter, Descartes concludes, "I am, I exist, that is cer-
18tain." ' Pursuing his logic, he affirms the existence of
the conscious self, of God, and of an external world. He
falls short of pure ide?^lism, however, in his persistent
dualistlc conception of mind and nature, and of mind and
body.
Also in the seventeenth century, Spinoza set forth his
idealistic views. He taught that all reality is One Sub-
stance or God, of which mind and physical reality are two
17. Zeller, OGP, 182-185.
18. Descartes, TJIFT, 78,
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of en infinite number of attributes or aspects. All tem-
poral existences are determinations or modes of these at-
tributes, and are rigidly connected in the One Substance;
hence, everything happens of necessity. Human freedom, or
salvation, is to be attained by seeing things "sub specie
aeternitatis , " chat is, through "intuitive knowledge" which
understands and acquiesces in the necessity which proceeds
from God's nature. "The knowledge of the eternal and infi-
nite essence of God, which every idea involves, is adequate
and perfect." Spinoza's philosophy is developed geometri-
20
cally in the Ethica . his chief work.
During the same period, Leibniz advanced his rational-
istic idealism in his Monadologie
. He held that ultimately
all reality consists of monads, which are indestructible
and unchanging spiritual beings or souls. Monads differ in
the degree to which they are conscious, that is, the degree
to which they reflect the mind of God, and in this respect
there is a continuous gradation from the clarity of human
consciousness down to the dullness of inorganic things,
which are like minds asleep. God, actus purus . is the Sup-
reme Monad, the highest and perfect Being,
19. Spinoza, Ethics
.
II, Prop, XLVI.
20. Thillv, FOP, 292-306,
21. Ibid ,. 2^7-37^.
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Developing the Cartesian doctrine of the primacy of
thought, Locke, a theist, hes a germ of idealism in his
theory of the subjectivity of all ideas. He denies the ex-
istence of moral principles, of categories, and of innate
ideas, and he says, "Let us then suppose the mind to be, as
we s y, white paper, void of all characters without any
22
ideas." The content of the mind, a tabula rasa at birth,
is attributable to sense-experience and to reflection upon
sensory data,
Locke's theory of the subjective character of ideas
lec to a pure idealism in the mentalism of George Berkeley.
Berkeley acknov^ledges only two really existent orders: God
and spirits. Teaching that perception derives from the di-
rect action of God upon finite spirits, he writes:
I find that T can excite ideas at pleasure, and vary
and shift the scene as oft as I think fit, . . . But
whatever power I may have over my own thoughts, I
find the ideas actually perceived by Sense have not
a like dependence on m^ will, \*Ihen ... I open my
eyes, it is not in my power to choose whether I shall
see or no, or to determine what particular objects
shall present themselves to view; , , . the ideas
imprinted on them are not creatures of m^r will. There
is therefore some other V/ill or Spirit that produces
them,"^*^
Theories holding to the "absolute exis-fence of sensible
22. Locke, EMIT, 122,
23. Berkeley, PHK, in Fraser, WGB, I, 273

16
ob.jects in thems elves or without the mind " according to
Berkeley "mark out either a direct contradiction, or else
24.
nothing at all, , . . Their esse is percipi. " Fraser re-
gards ess e is percipi as Berkeley's initial principle, and
25
refers to it as "intuitive" or "self-evident."
Berkeleian mentalism inspired Hume's sensationalism,
and Fume in turn stirred Kant from his "dogmatic slumber,""^
and led to the Critical Philosophy. Kant taught the ide-
ality of space and time. He held that theism, while beyond
the realm of science and logically undemonstrable, is the
conclusion of pure speculative reason.
To advance from the knowledge of one-self (the soul)
to a owledge of the world, and through it to a
knowledge of the Supreme Being, is a progression so
natural that it suggests the logics 1 advance of rea-
son from premises to conclusion. ^'^
Also, Kant affirmed thst knowledge is produced by the syn-
thetic activity of the logical self-consciousness upon the
data of sense perception. He says that
thoughts without content are eppty, perceptions with-
out conceptions are blind; , , , and hence the com-
plex content of pure perception must first be surveyed,
taken up into thought and combined before there can
24, Berkeley, PHK, in Fraser, I, 270.
25. Ibid, , 259, footnote 3,
26, Kant, PTFM, 7.
27. ^'Jatson, TPK, 143.
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be any knowledpfe. This act I call synthesis . ,
by which is meant the act of putting various ideas
together and grasping their multiplicity in one con-
sciousness,
. , .
The unity of apperception is the
supreme principle of all our knowledge.
The Transcendental or Critical Idealism of Kant gave
rise to the movement which began with the Subjective Ideal-
ism of Fichte, developed into the theism and Objective Ide-
alism of Schelling, and culminated in the Absolute or logi-
cal Idealism of Hegel,
Fichte sought to perfect the Kantian system by relating
the Practical Reason to the Pure Reason, He deduced a priori
from the Ego, which is Kant^s "transcendental unity of apper-
ception," both the categories of the knowledge of nature,
and also the doctrines of morals and rights, thus uniting
the two critiques in one system, the "Science of Ky^owledge,"
Kis basic doctrine, which "he regards as the keystone of
the critical philosophy," is the idea that the Ego, or will,
is a free self'-determining activity, and is the only true
reality,
Schelling advanced the idealistic development by for-
mulating a system which makes the ego and the world two
poles of the Absolute. The phenomenal world is a product
28. Watson, TPK, 49, 67.
29. Thilly, HOP, ^31-442

of the infinite activity of the Absolute Ego, and indivi-
dual self-consciousness, the necessary categories of
thought, and sense-perception are produced by the Absolute
Reason.
Hegel taught that the universe is one absolute spirit
or Idee expressing itself by an eternal dialectical proeess
By characteristic dialectical steps, Hegel passes from the
formal and empty conception of Being , which logically e-
auates to nothing , and advances to the fullest and richest
conception, that of mind or spirit. "This," he writes, "is
the supreme definition of the Absolute," and "the essential
feature of mind or spirit is liberty:" and this free mind
manifests itself in morality and law.^-"-
Lotze ie among the prominent representatives of the
new idealism which followed the decline of Hegelianism and
the supreiTEcy of materialism. He teaches that personality
is the ultimate fact of fundamental significance; that God
is good and is personal; that He is distinct from the world
the Creator of the cosmos, and the divine determinant of th
last end of the world: that personality is the highest
value and that the most valuable is also the most real.^^
30. Thilly, HOP, ^59-'^ 57.
31. Hegel, POM, II, II, 328.
33. Thilly, HOP, 49^-497.

"Minds," he v/rites, are Real," and "all that is Real is
mind."^^ Regarding Lotze*s very consiflerable influence
upon modern idealistic thought, Knudson has this to say:
It is largelv to his influence that the revival
of theism during the past thirty or forty years
is due, a revival so marked that it is acknowl-
eri^red to be the most striking movement i?* contem-
porary philosophy of religion.
Modem idealism, drav/ing elements from Berkeley, Leife
niz, Hegel, Kant, and Lotze, as well as from Plato and
Aristotle and from the Hebrew tradition, is represented in
America by such men as Borden Parker Bowne, Josiah Royce,
W.E.Hocking, J.B.Pratt, R.T.Flewelling, and E.S.Brightman.
(2)^iTvT)es of Idealism . The term idealism presents dif-
ficulties of classification. Idealism "is a very catholic
and inclusive thing, a sort of Messianic Age in which, the
lion and the lamb lie down together It embraces many
divergent points of view, including such varied doctrines
as those of TTatorp and Bergson, of G. P.Adams and McTaggart,
of Bosanquet and James Ward. It admits the personalistic
system wherein the clue to reality inheres in the self-con-
scious self, and with broad catholicity it likewise admits
33. Lotze, MIC, X, 6^2.
34. Knudson, POP, 62.
35. Flewelllng, art. (1942).
36. Brightman, POI, 165.

Bradley* s system wherein, per contra , the self is held to
be mere appearance, and the highest reality to be an im-
personal Absolute. All are idealistic in that all regard
reality as basically mental or psychical, and hence anti-
materialistic. At the same time there are striking dif-
ferences among them, suggesting certain classifications.
Both Hoernle and Brightman see idealism as falling in-
to four chief forms. Hoernle classifies idealistic iews
as follows:
(a) Spiritual Pluralism , which interprets Reality
as a Society of Spirits: (b) Spiritual Monism ,
,
which interprets Reality as the manifestation, or
objectification of a single Spiritual Snergy; (c)
Criti cal (Kantian) Idealism , which avoids offer-
ing a theor;vr of Reality but makes that every form
of experience, because of the universal and neces-
sary principles of 'Reason' in it, has a contribu-
tion to make to the theory of Reality: (d) Abso-
lute Idealism , which attempts a synthetic, or sy-
noptic, interpretation of Reality in the light of
its various appearances.^'
Brightmsn says that "there are at least four he in types of
idealism," and he lists them as follows:
The first, the Platonic, asserts the objectivity
of value. The second, the Berkeleian, holds that
all knowable reality, and perhaps all reality
uberhaupt. is of the nature of consciousness. The
third, the Hegelian, points to the coherence of
37. Hoernle, lAP, 306.
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one absolute system es the only true value of ex-
istence. The fourth, the Lotzean, finds in self-
hood or personality an ultimate fact of fundamen-
tal significance. These are the great idealisms.
Tnas^much as Hoernle»s classification omits Platonism,
Brightmsn*B grouping seems the more comprehensive, and,
therefore, will be used as an index for the following brief
discussion of four chief forms of idealism.
(i) Platonic idealism is marked by insistence upon the
obijectivity of value anfl the primacy of mind, and by oppo-
sition to materialism. 39 "Mind is the king of heaven and
earth.
. , , Mind orders all things. "^^
(ii) Berkeleiaii idealism is a pure idealism which
views all reality as of the nature of consciousness. It
rests upon three fundamental concepts: the conception of
matter: the conception of God; and the conception of the na-
ture and status of human spirits. Berkeley rejects any con-
ception of matter as a core of being supporting the quali-
ties of things. Spirit is the sole support of things: "That
there is no substance wherein ideas can exist beside spirit
is to me evident." Things are .just as they are experi-
enced in the perceiving mind; material reality is idea, for
38. Brightman, POI, 171.
39. Supra . w
40. Plato, Phileb., 29,
^1. Berkeley, DHP, 101.
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it is given In terms of idea and in no other way. "Esse
is percipi , nor is it possible they things should have
any existence out of the minds of thinking things which
perceive them, "^^ There are two kinds of ideas, active and
passive. The former are contingent upon the will of the
individual and can be shifted at pleasure, but the latter
the individual must accept as given, for they are caused by
God, the Supreme Agent, and constitute the unchangeable or-
der of nature, "the admirable connexion whereof sufficiently
43
testifies the wisdom and benevolence of its Author."
Things are ideas, complexes of sensations; human spirits are
limited agents capable of entertaining and manipulating
ideas. "I myself , " says Berkeley, "am not my ideas, but
somewhat else, a thinking, active principle that perceives,
knows, wills, and operates about ideas. "'^'^
(ill) Hegelian idealism conceives the only true value
of existence as residing in the coherence of one absolute
system. The central idea in Hegel's system is his concep-
tion of Reality as an organic TVhole, the parts of which can
be understood only in their relationship to the ^?/hole; con-
sidered In isolation, the parts are mere abstractions. "The
42. Berkeley, PHK, 259.
43. Ibid
., 27^.
44. Berkeley, DHP, 95,
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truth is the ^"/hole."^^ It is not a static whole, but "a
-4-6
self-becoming, a s elf-development, " a dialectical pro-
cess in which Spirit, representing the higher rational and
spiritual capacities, is forever striving toward richer ex-
pression and more complete realization. It is a rational
process seeking the goal of Freedom conceived as a state in
which the highest capa.bilities of man achieve the fullest
possible realization. The dynamic factor underlying the
whole process, the all-inclusive unity in which it is em-
braced, and in a sense the goal it seeks, is the Absolute
who constantly strives toward more complete espression of
His inexhaustibly magnificent potentialities.^^ At times
the Hegelian Absolute seems to resemble the impersonal All
of Spinoza's pantheism, but Hegel's emphasis upon Reason
anr Purpose points rather to a personal Absolute.
(iv) Lotzean idealism, as previous discussion has in-
dicated,'^^ regards personality as the fundamental reality,
and teaches that God is the good and personal Creator of
the cosmos. Lotze has exerted a profo»»nd influence upon
modern personalistic irJ^alism.
(v) Modern idealism holds to a belief in God, the
4-5. Hegel,
46. Ibid.,
47. Ibid
.,
48. He{?el,
^9. Ibid.,
50, Supra ,
POM, I, 16.
II, 16.
II, 327-329.
POH, 34-36.
101.
18*
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Supreme Person and the Creator of a society of persons
other thPn Himself, "so that the universe is ultimately a
society of selves, not a single self."^^ The universe
exists through the creative act of the will and purpose of
the one Supreme Perf5on or Mind: "God is absolute will or
absolute agent, forever determining himself according to
52
rational and eternal principles." The moral nature of
man, as experienced, inspires faith in the moral goodness
of Ood. "The facts neither compel nor forbid this faith.
53
They permit it, and to som.e extent illustrate it," Mnd
and values are supreme "in the eternal processes of all
being. "^^
ii. Definition of Idealism
Some philosophers have felt that idealism is perhaps
not f.he best term for the great philosophic system it des-
ignates. Hocking thinks that spiritualism or mentalism
would be more exactly definitive. Sellers is inclined to
use idealism and spiritualism synonymoi»sly, explicitly
stating that he considers spiritualism the better expres-
sion because "idealism has come to be identified in exact
philosophy with eplstemological idealism," and also because
51. Brightman, TTP, 246.
52. Bowne, Theism
.
198,
53. Ibid
. .
2^9.
5-^. Brightman, NV, 91.
55. Hocking, TOP, 2^8,
i
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It has been associated too much with "ethical and religious
idealism, that is, with eulogistic attitudes, to serve as a
technical metaphysical expression."^ However, as Hocking
observes, spiritualism , too, "has been drafted to other
57
uses." the whole, generally accepted usage seems to
sustain the view that the "term idealism is so embedded in
the history of philosophy that attempts to eradicate it are
CO
probably destined to failure,"
Brightman says that "it would be safer to admit that it
is impossible to define the generic term idealism with pre-
cision," and proposes what he calls "a vague working defini-
tion:"
All idealism is characterized by belief in the ulti-
mate reality or cosmic significsnee either of mind
(using the term in the broadest sense) or of the
ideals and values revealed to and prized by mind.
Ir^ealism is the theory which holds that reality is of the na-
ture of mind or consciousness, and that values are objective.
If the term mind is construed in the broad sense of the psy-
chical, this definition is sufficiently comprehensive to em-
brace all types of idealism, including Bradley's idealistic
conception of reality in terras of a unity of experience.
56. Sellars, PPP, 192.
57. Hocking, TOP, 2^9.
58. Brightman, POI, 172.
59. Ibid.
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Wilbur Long's definition is similar and somewhat more
detailed. He writes that idealism is
any system or doctrine whose fundamental interpre-
tative principle is ideal , , . emphasizing m.ind
(soul, spirit, life) or what is characteristically
of pre-eminent value or significance to it. . . ,
Idealism stresses the supra- or non-spatial, non-
pictorial, incorporeal, suprasensuQus
,
normative,
or valuational, and teleological.*^^
Because the idealistic view regards the intrinsic na-
ture of reality as consciousness or mind, idealism has often
been confused with solipsism. Actually there is no basis
for the confusion. Sheldon clarifies the distinction thus:
Idealism.
. . . which is confessedly monistic, need
not be subjective; acknowledged idealists deny the
reduction of the world to a phase of one's mind.
. .
The differentia of idealism from subjectivism is the
belief in a Great "^ind who is more than any of us;
subjectivism fixes uvon the private mind as the last
term of metaphysics.^1
Schopenhauer, for example, seems close to solipsism in pas-
sages such as the opening sentence in The World as ^Vill and
Idea
:
"The world is my idea"--this is a truth which holds
good for everything that lives and knows, though man
alone can bring it into reflective and abstract con-
sciousness.^'^
60. Lonpr, art. (1942).
61. Sheldon, SSPD, ^3.
62. Schopenhauer, WVI, I, 3,
I
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But Schopenhauer is not a solipslst, for he believes that
63 - - /beyond nature is the Idea, the 'Vill, which produces it.
Leibniz and Berkeley, too, have been mistakenly looked upon
as sollpsists, but solipsism is inconsistent with the view,
held by both, that finite minds and nature are dependent
upon a Supreme Mnd.
All in all, there appears no justification for the mis-
conception which identifies idealism and solipsism, for
idealism is clearly distinguished by the fundamental belief
in a Supreme ^find which is beyond nature and is greater than
any finite mind,
iii. ]*%in Traits of Idealism
The main traits of idealism may be briefly set forth as
follows: (1) Idealism is characterized by the philosophical
method of synopsis.' (2) Idealism seeks the holistic goal
of a coherent interpretation of all of experience. (3)
For idealism, being is activity. (4) Idealism holds that
consciousness, or mind, is the ultimate explanation of the
universe, and hence is the alternative to materialism.^^
63, Schopenhauer, WI, I, 169: II, 176; III, 220,
64. Briffhtman, ITP, 122, 237,
65, Ibid,, 66, 252, 356.
66. Bowne, ?^T, 31, 339.
67. Bovme, T^HIT, l'«9, 2^3, 35^: Theism, 1^8, 173;
Brierhtman, "^01, 172.
68, Long, art, (19-^2).
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(5) Idealism views the universe as an expression of cosmic
purpose, (6) Idealism believes that values possess an ob-
70jective status in the structure of the universe.
Idealism is the speculative view of those philosophers
who, seeking a knowledge of all things in their ultimate
causes, affirm that mind, or the spiritual and ideal, is of
basic importance in reality. The idealist clings to the hy-
pothesis that human reason is not a chance spark produced by
the clash of blind forces, but a distinctive attribute of
man mho is purposely created by God. He asserts that
mind, spirit, or personality is the real energy
of the universe^ and that concern for values and
their development in every conscious being is at
the root of every natural process, all life, all
evolution, the entire cosmos. '''I
For the idealist, human reason is the divine gif* empowering
man to grasp with Plato the concept of a Supreme Reason in-
herent in the constitution and functioning of the universe
ideals and values do not Inhere solely in man, "but endure
eternally as "an essential part of the objective structure of
the universe, "'^'^
69. Bowne, lltET, 2^8-257; Theism, 82; Brightman, W, 62, 63:
Brightman, ITP, 313-315.
70. Bowne, Theism, 173; Brightman, ITP9* 149-165, 354;
Brightman, ^IL, 285-287; POI, 211,
71. Brightman, W, 90.
72. :^lato, Laws, X, 897C.
73. Brightman, 286,

2, Materialism
i. Brief Survey of the History
(1) Origin and Development. Materialism, like idealism
traces its history to Oreece of the fourth and fifth centu-
ries B.C., the era of Plato, the great idealist, and of De-
mocritus, the first important materialist. Democritus pro-
pounded the theory that all things are composed of impercep-
tibly small, indivisible particles called atoms, the "finest
smoothest, most agile atoms" constituting the mind. Ifete-
rialism has worn many garbs, but all forms of materialism
and naturalism find their source, their ultimate principle
of explanation, in the Democritean precept: "Only the atoms
and the void are real,"'^^ although the conception of the na-
ture of the atom has been revolutionized by modern science.
Epicurus accepted Democritus' atomism and taught that
happiness and pleasure are the natural aim of life. Since
"Nature leads every organism to prefer its own good to
77
every other good," pleasure is the only conceivable end
of life and action. Epicurus particularly emphasized the
materialistic thesis that all things are produced hy natural
causes, and require no supernatural explanation.
7^. Winn, art^.j:i9^2),
75. Democritus, "The Fragments," in Bakewell, SAP, 60.
76. Winn, ibid . '
77. Zeller, OGP, 112.

In Tie Natura Reriim , Lucretius sets forth a ruthless
materialism. Nothing exists save atoins, space, and law,
and the fundamental law is that of evolution and dissolu-
tion ever^Awhere. Soul and mind are composed of the small-
est atoms, are evolved with the body, and die with the death
of the body.'^^ It was through Lucretius' De Rerum Natura,
called by Professor Shotwell "the most marvelous performance
in all antioue literature, "'^^ that the influence of Democ-
ritus was transmitted until the Renaissance when scholars
again turned to the study of nature.
Thomas Hobbes, inspired by Bacon's conception of the
universe in Democritean mechanical terms, developed his thor
ough-going materialism and uncompromising atheism. Hobbes
held that the only subject matter of philosophy is found in
bodies and their movements, and that "consciousness . . ,
is a jarring of the nervous system.
The German Baron Paul d'Holbach, a prominent material-
ist and one of the Encyclopedists, was the author of Le sys -
t^me de la Nature , knovm as "the Bible of Atheism. "^^
The work is an elaborate system of materialistic metaphysics
Everything is explained by matter and motion, as
78. Thilly, HOP, 101.
79. Shotwell, IHH, 109.
80. 'Vinn, art. (19^2).
81. Fuller, art. (19^2).
B2. V/inn, iMd
.
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the effect of necessary laws. There is no soul;
thought is a function of the brain; and matter
alone is immortal. The human will is strictly de-
termined; there is no design in nature nor outside
of nature, no teleology and no God.^
This epitome of the materialistic point of view, is, at the
same time a point-by-point denial of the basic idealistic
beliefs.
The dialectical materialism of Karl Marx and Frederick
Engels is a philosophy which holds that the observable
world of nature is real in its own right "without reserva-
tions;" there is no transcendental or supernatural cause;
mind is an outgrowth of matter. This materialism is re-
garded as dialectical in that all things are viewed as inter-
connected by universal and radical change, for every existence
is a complex of opposing elements which are constantly chang-
ing each thing into something else.^^
(2) Modern Conception of Materialism; ^^aturalism . Like
traditional materialism, modern naturalism "is firmly directed
against all philosophical idealism, theism, or personalism.
"
Unlike traditional materialism, modern naturalism disavows
the pre-"nineteenth-century-physics" concept of the impene-
trable, indivisible, eternal atom. The electro-magnetic
83. ^illy, HOP, 387.
8A. Somerville, art. (1942),
85. Brightman, W, 83.
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theory of moaern physics shattered this sge-oM view. Dis-
cussing these "revolutionary changes," Eddington writes:
"T'/hatever further changes of view are in prospect, a rever-
se
sion to the substantial atom is unthinkable." . Atoms are
no longer regarded as solid; they are looked upon as fields
of force. Upon this contribution of modern science, recent
naturalists have developed their system, and have come to
look upon existence as activity.
ii. Definition of ]^feterialism
Materialism is the philosophical system v.hich stands
opposed to idealism. Materialism regards matter as the
only reslity, and endeavors to explain all existence in
terms of the blind activity of matter,
Eisler's definition of materialism stresses the mate-
rialistic belief in the sole existence of the corporeal. He
writes
:
Materialismus heisst die Zuruckfuhrung alles
Seienden auf Materie, alles Geschenens auf phy-
s(^sche, materlelle Prozesse,
^
des Geistes, der v
Seele, des Psychischen auf Korperliche Funkti-
onen. Fiir den M ist alles Seiende, ^Virkliche
materiell, korperlich, etwas Immaterielles, Un-
korperliches gibt es nicht. '
Brightman, too, finds the core of materialism in the "theory
86, Eddinerton, Tmv, 3.
87. Eisler, HDP, s.v. "Ifeterialismiis.
"

that matter and its laws are all that there Is or explain
go
all," and he amplifies this statement in another passage
which says that materialists
hold that unconscious matter or some collection of
unconscious immaterial entities or unconscious en-
ergy is the basal reality and the unconscious source
of all life, mind, and values.
Lalande, also, poinxs out the same idea as the central mate
rialistic thesis, and quotes Wolff on the subject: Material
ism is here defined as the
doctrine d'apr^s laquelle il n*existe d'autre sub-
stance j^up la mati^re, ^ laquelle on attribue des
pro^ietes variables suivsnt les divers es formes de
materialisme, mais qui pour caract^re commun d'etre
congu comrae un ensemble d'objets individuels, re-
preslntables, figures, mobiles, occupant chacun une
cuntur philosophi, qui tantummodo entia materialia
sive corpora existere affirmant," (Wolff, Psych,
ration,, 33,)^^
In Runes there is a similar interpretation of mate-
rialism, with particular emphasis upon xne aetaal of an
intelligent First Cause, "Only matter is existent or real"
and it is the "primordial or fundamental constituent of the
universe," The ultimate cause is not intelligent nor pur-
poseful; nothing supernatural exists; all is explained
88. Brightman, ITP, 388.
89. Brightman, KV, 91.
90. L8,lande (ed.), VDP, s.v. "Materialisme."
"Materialistae di

solely by material, nonmental entitles "having certain
elementary ph^/-slcal powers, "^^
lii. Main Traits of Tfeterialism
The main traits of materialism, which are directly op-
posed to those of idealism, may be listed as "follows: (1)
Materialism is rooted in the scientific method of analysis,^
(2) Limited by method, materialism is restricted to the
"only objects science can investigate which are the physi-
cal or material (that is, public, manipulable, nonmental,
natural, or sensible." (3) Traditional materialism held
that ultimate reality consists of particles extended in
space modern materialism, generally known as recent natu-
ralism, believes that all reality is of the' nature of ener-
gy. (^) For materialism, "everything is explainable in'
terms of matter in motion, or matter and energy, or simply
matter (depending upon the conception of matter enter-
96talned). (6) Traditional materialism attributes the de-
velopment of the universe to mechanism, the automatic func-
tioning of matter in motion; recent naturalism, to evolu-
tion; both exclude all forms of supernaturalism,^'^ The
91. Keeton, art. (1942).
92. Brlghtmsn, TTP, 2A,
93. Keeton, ibid.
94. Nellson, Ted.), WNID, s.v. "materialism."
95. Jenkins, art. (19^2); Krikorian (ed.), 288-289.
96. Keeton, ibid
.
97. Felbleman, art. (19-^2).
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materialistic axiology is subjective: the greatest values
that man can seek or obtain are "wealth, bodily satisfac-
tions, sensuous pleasures, or the like,"^
The discussion in this chapter has outlined the dia-
metrical opposition between the two traditional systems of
philosophical thought, idealism and materialism. Briefly,
for idealism, mind is the ultimate reality; nature means
physical nature, and mind, values, and universals stand out
side nature; value, or goodness, is intrinsic to the very
structure of the universe. Materialism denies these ideal-
istic beliefs; for materialism., matter is the ultimate real
ity; nature means all existence, and caused by the blind ac
tivity of matter.
98. Keeton, art. (1942).
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CHAPTER III
mUJ TRAITS OF RECENT NATURALISM
1, Definition of Nature
i. Definitions in General
The term nature has a bewildering array of equivocal
connotations. In Baldwin, there are listed some thirty-
seven different meanings for the word, Rees' discussion of
the term in Hastings requires fifty-three pages. Webster '
s
New Internati onal Dictionary ^ in upwards of twelve hundred
words, differentiates twelve distinct concepts conveyed by
the noun. Morrow opens his article in Runes by character-
izing nature as "a highly ambiguous term."^ In Lalande,
one is advised to avoid using the v^-yrd. because of its vague-
ness and ambiguity: "On doit ^viter autant qu'on peut I'em-
ploi de ce mot vague et ambigu.""* Sisler's Kandworterbuch
d er Philosophie devotes more than sixteen hundred words to
the definition of the term.^ Dewey, asserting that "few
terms in philosophy have a wider or looser use or involve
greater ambiguity''," points out that historically the word
has been used with absolutely contrary implications, for
1. Rees, art. (1928).
2. Neils on (ed.), ^'/NID, s.v. "nature."
3 . Morrow , art
.
( 19^ 2 )
.
4. Mentre, art. (1926).
6. Eisler, HDP, s.v. "Natur."
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example
:
to mark off, in a most definite way, the world
from God: and again to identify the world with
God? and yet again to afford a connecting Prin-
ciple between God and details of the world.
In addition to the difficulties presented hy the con-
fusing mass of literature which has accumulated about this
one v/ord, there is a puzzling disinclination on the part of
some writers about nature to define the subject of their
discussion. A remarkable example of this failure to define
is to b e found in Nature, Man and God by ^'/illiam Temple,*^
although the purpose of the work is an investigation of na-
ture. Likewise, John Oman, in The T^Tatural and the Super -
natural^ offers no specific definition of his field of
study. Nor is there a definition available in James Orr's
The Christian View of ^od and the ^-/orld , although a con-
sideration of nature v/ould seem to be a necessary part of
any treatise about the world. Among the naturalists them-
selves, who might be expected to be particularly lucid re-
garding their crucial concept, vagueness and obscurity seem
to be the hall-marks of their treatment of this term.
Despite the ambiguities, and despite much indifference
6. Dewey, art.(lP^O).
7. Temple, miG; cited by Brightman in 32,
8. Oman, TN^ : cited by Brightman in NV, ibid.
9. Orr, GG^.V; cited by Briphtman in 31,
I
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to clarification among authors, nevertheless, there is both
historical and general usage to support a clear precise
meaning of the word.
Etymologically, nature is derived from the Latin na-
tura which is from nasci, to be born, and has reference to
the production of things, to the idea of coming into being.
Hence, it generally includes in its connotation the ideas
of activity and energy with an implication of law and per-
manence. Etymology conveys the idea that nature means that
which continuously produces life. But usage often muti-
lates etymological interpretations.
A long tradition sets forth two antithetical concep-
tions of natur
e
. The principal ambiguity has been betv/een
nature understood as all of reality and as creative and ac-
tive, and nature construed as the physical universe, created
and passive.
The primitive ascribed the origin of life and action to
nature as a whole, ^lato made a sharp distinction between
the perfect, true, ultimate reality consisting of transcen-
dent universals, and the thinp'S of sense which are not com-
pletely reel. He differentiated between the active formal
element and passive material. In the Laws , the Athenian
stranger says that the materialists
have fallen into error about the true nature of the

Gods, Nearly all of them seem to be ignorant of
the natura and power of the soul, especially in
what relates to rer origin: they do not know that
she is amonp: the first of things, and before all
bodies, and is the chief author of their changes
and trans positions.-^*-^
Aristotle, too, who is said to have "exercised greater
influence upon western thought than any other single man,"^-^
continued in his teaching the distinction between the Crea-
tor and the created. He held that God, the unmoved Mover
and unchanging Cause is separate from Nature, the moved phy-
sical universe, which He caused to exist. "God moves the
world," h^; said, "as the beloved object moves the lover. •^'^
In pantheistic and naturalistic views, this antithesis
betv/een God and nature all but disappears. The influential
pantheism of Spinoza, for example, views all reality as One
Substance: Nature, Substance, and God are identical. Spi-
noza teaches that "no substance can be given or be conceived
besides God;" and that "whatever is, is in God;"^"^ a pas-
sage from his correspondence reeds:
I hold that God is the immanent, and not the extra-
neous, cause of all things, I say. All is in God;
10. P^ato, Laws, X, 891.
11. NeilsonTed. ) , ^TOD, s.v. "Aristotelianism. "
12. Morrow, art. (1942).
13. Aristotle, Met., IX, 7.
14. Spinoza, Ethics
, I, XIV, XV.
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all lives and moves In ^od. *^
This doctrine of Spinoza's is the core of traditional pan-
theistic thought. Modern naturalism, also, regards nature
as all of reality, but with no immanent God as in Spino-
zean teaching.
There is an unnecessary vagueness and obscurity in the
definition of nature as "everything" or as "all that there
is," The definition does not define; it conveys no clear
concept of the term beyond the meaning of all and everything ,
words usf^d in a generally accepted sense. It seems arbi-
trary to establish as a superfluous sjmonjrm for all, the
term nature, for which custom has established a specific
meaning. In recognized usage, nature has been understood
as designating a part rather than the whole of reality; na-
ture has been taken to denote the v/orld of sense objects,
the world of matter in space and time. The word hav*^ been
generally used in a sense restricted to the physical world
and exclusive of the mental world. This signification is
in expressions such as natural philosophy, natural history,
and natural science, which deal only with the constitution,
production, properties and laws of material substances,
16, Spinoza, Spistle 21,
16. Jenkins, art. ^ 1942),
i
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There is considerable recognized authority available
supporting the definition of nature as specifically denot-
ing the physical world. Webster's ^^ew Internati onal Dic-
tionary , for example, includes the definition: "The system
of all phenomena in space and time: . . . more narronvly, the
totality of physical reality, exclusive of minds and the
mental. "'^'^ Immanuel Kant, too, while necessarily distin-
guishing among various meanings, based his o^ti fundamental
concept of the word upon the distinction betv/een the realm
of freedom and the realm of nature. He wrote that
die unbedingte Kausalitat in der Erscheinung
(heisst) die Freiheit; die bedingte dage^en
heisst im engeren Verstande, Natursache.^°
And in another passage: "Natur ist das Desein der Dinge, so-
fern es nach allgemeinen Gesetzen bestimmt ist."-'-^ Nature,
for Kant, "is the object of all possible experience;" "pos-
sible" means logically consistent, and "experience means
our sensations as ordered in space and time in accordance
with such necessary principles as the law of cause and ef-
fect, which Kant calls categories. "^^^ Thus, nature is the
object of the senses, and the object of learning through
17. Neils on (ed.), WID, s.v. "nature."
18. Kant, KRV, A419.
19. Kant, Proleg
. , 14.
20. Brightman, NV, 36,
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the senses. "The starry heavens above" are a part of na-
ture fDU we learn of them through our senses, but "the mor-
al law -dthin" is not a part if nature for it is not known
throug-h the senses nor may it be investigated by the natu-
ral sciences. Kant and V-ebster sustain the general inter-
pretation of nature as meaning the physical v»rorld.
Eisler, too, holds a brief for the specific definition.
His discussion of nature includes the following:
Natur bedeutet , . . den Gegensatz zum Geist, also
den Inbegriff des sinnlich V/ahrnehmbahren, des rein
Objektiven, der materiellen Dinge und deren Eigen-
schaften und Relationen, der physikalisch-chemischen,
anorganischen und organischen Prozesse, die Welt der
Materiellen, Dynamisch-Energetischen, die KBrperwelt,
im Tjhterschiede von der Tnnenwelt, der Welt des
Psychischen, des Seelenlebens, der Geistigkeit, des
Bewussteins als solchen.^-^
This passaere from Eisler sets forth unmistakably the tradi-
tional antithesis between the physical and the mental, the
term nature denoting the former concept. In Lalande, the
same interpretation of the word is supported. I'or example,
Nature
. , , s'oppose h l^Bsprit, ^ Liberte, a
Personality.
. . . (Le mot nature) designe le monde
visible, en tant au'il s 'oppose aux idees, aux sen-
timents, etc. ... II desieme I'univers, le monde
materiel.'^
Kant has said that "philosophy teems with defective
21. Eisler, KDP, s.v. "Fatur."
22. Lalande (ed.), s.v. "Nature."

definitions, a confusion which is increased by the lack
of nice discrimination in defining nature as all that
there
is. The sciences of nature do not concern themselves with
everything. They are equipped to investigate only obser-
vable data accessible to the senses; the publicly manipu-
lable measures of the natural sciences cannot adequately in-
vestigate the richest areas of life, such as, the good, jus-
tice, truth, beauty, and holiness. "Sapientis est ordinare.
It would contribute to that part of wisdom which is the or-
dering of knowledge, if clear-cut definitions of words were
preserved so that all would know precisely the idea in-
tended by the use of any word. It has been shown that rec-
ognized authorities as well as general usage define nature
as the world of sense objects. This clear and distinct defi
nition possesses definitiveness ; it sharply marks off the
meaning of na tur
e
^om the meaning of all or everything .
Also, this specific delimitation of meaning is analogous to
the limitations of the objects of the natural sciences.
Inasmuch as the term has preserved a respected particular
and specific sense, it seems wiser to retain that meaning,
rather than to contribute further to the teeming melee of
"defective definitions."
23. Kant, CPR, B759, note.

li. Definition by Recent Naturalists
The volume entitled Matiiralism and th e Hiims.n Spirit has
24been called "Fatiiralism' s most comprehensive manifesto."
On the word of the editor, Yervant H. Krikorian, the contri-
butors to this sjonposium are "primarily representative of
nat^iralism, "^^ These representative naturalists look upon
"contemporary naturalism ... as a distinctively American
philosophy"^^ and they regard John Dewey as the leader of
the movement. These naturalists tend to be more or less pro-
fuse in their recognition of Dewey's influence on their
thought. A few of their characteristic acknowledgments may
be mentioned: "The philosophy of John Dewey constitutes the
vanguard of twentieth century naturalism."^ "The fortunes
of the naturalistic principle in the twentieth century ap-
proximate a catalogue of the writings of John Dewey, "^^ a
statement which virtually identifies naturalism with Dewey-
ism. "^ofessor Larrabee speaks of "the signal services of
Dewey" ... as creator of "a major naturalistic system, "^^
and Costello hails the Dewey view as " a force in American
30life." ^ofessor Randall, in his article, "The Nature of
24. Brightraan, MV, 102.
25. Krikorian (ed.), NHS, "Preface."
26. Randall, art.(1944).
27. Lavine, art. (1944).
28. Ibid.
29. Larrabee, art. (1944).
30. Costello, art.(194A).
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l^^aturelism," is particularly articulate regarding the extent
of Devrey's prestige among naturalists:
That John Dewey's lifelong preoccupation with sci-
entific method olog}/- has made his "experimental nat-
uralism" the great inspiration of the present gen-
eration of naturalistic thinkers in this country,
is obvious on almost every page of these essays.
His concerns and problems touch the very heart of
their o^vn philosophic drive.
Outside the naturalistic fold, too, Dewey is regarded
as the leading figure of the naturalistic movement. For ex-
ample, in Vergilius Perm's article entitled "Naturalism,"
John Dev/ey is the sole contemporary naturali,<=t named.
Brightman, also, looks upon Dewey as the chief exponent of
the naturalistic point of view. Outlining the age-old con-
flict between "materialists and idealists, or—to use more
modern terms—naturalists and personalists, " Brightman
writes
:
"^n (Greece there were Deraocritus and Plato; . . .
In China were the idealists Lu Hsiang-shan and
Wang Yang-ming and the priraitivistic naturalist
Chuang Tzu. In Rome, Lucretius wrote De natura
r erum and Cicero wrote De natura deorum . In Ger-
many the materialist Feuerbach opposed the ideal-
ist Hegel, In the America of today John Dewey
is a great naturalistic leader and William Ernest
Hockins? is a great idealist.
In this highly selective roster of some twelve names
31. Randall, art. (1944).
32. Perm (ed.), EOR, 518.
33. Brightman, NV, 111.

typifying philosophical movements of some 2600 years, Dewey
stands as the symbol of modern naturalism. There is, ap-
parently, considerable justification for accepting Dewey's
vievfs as representative of the naturalistic position, Ae
the dynamic focus of recent naturalism, and as "the only
American about whom has been formed a regular philosophi-
cal school," Dewey is unique.
Regarding the definition of nature, a critical con-
cept of naturalism, naturalistic authors are singularly
lacking in precision and clarity. They say that nature is
all of reality without explicitly specifying what they mean
to include in the all, although, as this discussion will at-
tempt to show, they implicitly state that they believe that
the physical world is all of real existence.
Dewey himself sets the pattern for this vagueness
about the meaning of nature; he says that he hopes that his
philosophj/- "does not tell much about the environing world
which is discovered. "35 Nevertheless, a consideration of
some of his assertions will disclose indications of his
view.
The word nature, Dewey writes, denotes "perhaps the
oldest of all formulated and general philosophical concepts.
34. Cohen, art. (1921). t^^Is statement, however, over-
.
looks at least Bowne, James, and Perrv.
35. Schilpp, PJD, 533. ' '"^

and modern thoup-ht has added no "essentially new ideas to
the concept of nature." The modern contribution has been
rather to set forth clearly
the homogeneity of nature, its identical structure
and operation in all its parts, mundane and stellar,
... a conception which more than any other is the
philosophical idea underlying modern science, ^
The view here expressed is identical with that of tradition
al naturalism, Democritus, too, thought of nature as homo-
geneous when he said that "In reality there are only atoms
and the void," the finest and smoothest atoms composing the
human soul.
For Dev;ey, nature is a reality which, in all its parts
will yield to the importunities of science and to human con
trol. Nature, he says,
ceases to be something which must be accepted and
submitted to, endured or enjoyed, just as it is. It
is now something to be modified, to be intentionally
controlled.*^ '
Any attempt to "idealize and Jsationalize the universe at
large," De-vey regards as deplorable, because it is a "con-
fession of inability to master the course of things that
specifically concern us."*^^
36. Dewey, art. (19^0).
37. Dewey, OFC, 100.
38. Dewey, IDP, 8.
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Dewey specifically includes man in his conception of
a homogeneous nature. "It is Quite true," he says, "that in
my whole philosophy I regard men as part of nature, "^^ and
he is enually explicit in expressing his view that both the
mental and nonmental aspects of man are part of the "iden-
tical structure" of nature, a highly important naturalistic
belief which will received detailed discussion in Chapter
IV of this work. At this point, one selection from Dewey
may serve to indicate his position; he writes, for example:
The intelligent activity of man is not something
brought to bear upon nature from v;ithout; it is
nature realizing its omi potentialities in behalf
of a fuller and richer issue of events. ^
In Dewey *s view, then, nature is the totality of reality
inclusive of mathematical and logical objects, values,'^-'- and
of man in his entirety. It is homogeneous in character, "i<«-
42dentical in structure and operation in all its parts;""" it
Is a temporal process'*^ and the proper object of the physi-
cal sciences. Hence, Dewey's total reality, inclusive of
mind, must be physical and material.
As previously intimated, the entire Krikorian volume
39. Dewey, art. (193^).
40. Dewey, QFC, 214.
41. Ibid., 195.
^2. Dewey, art. (1940).
43. Dewey, QFC, 234.
44. Dewey, art. (1940),
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Is, in a sense, a tribute to the thought of .lohn Dewey.
Krikorian himself, in complete agreement with Dewey, une-
ouivocally sets forth his belief that nature is all of re-
ality anc! is physical:
Nature is the whole of reality. . . . "Nature"
means what empirical science finds it to be and
what completed empirical science would find it
to be. . . . Ihe matrix of life is physical. . .
What is important is the fact that life must be
interpreted and defined within the medium, of
mechanism. . . . Living beings are through and
through physico-chemical. ^
Krikorian's entire essay, "A Naturalistic View of Mind," con-
stitutes an apology for the naturalistic belief that nature
is all of existence, emphatically inclusive of mind as his
title suggests, and that in character it is ultimately phy-
sical and penetrable by the methods of the natural sciences.
There are many expressions of the same view. Herbert
W, Schneider, for example, puts it thus:
There is only one order of nature. , . . Things
are natural in so far as they work, and working
implies a mechanical continuum.
. . .
Nature is
primarily a category of creation
. . , the m.other
of mothers.
. . .
Nature has the same place in
naturalistic philosophy that "reality" has in
idealism.^
Schneider says that the nature of naturalism is identical
^6. Krikorian, art. (1944),
46. Schneider, art. ( 1944),
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with fbe reality of idealism, and that it consists in a
"mechanical continuum." Th.e "reality" of idealism is "the
vvhole of actual being; "^''' and the word mechanical , accord-
ing to Webster, refers to physical science. Fence,
E-chneider's one order of nature mr'St be spatial or physical.
Similarly, John Herman Randall, Jr., in his essay, "The
Nature of Naturalism, " says
:
For present-day naturalists "Nature" serves rather
as the all-inclusive category, corresponding to the
role played by "Being" in ^reek thought, or by
"Reality" for the idealists,
The philosophy of this v^iter has "put man and his experi-
ence squarely into the Nature over against which he had
bitherto been set."^^ Like Dewey, Randall is rigorously
"opposed, to all dualisms between Nature and another realm
of being ... to the fundamental dnalism pervading modern
thought between Nature and Ifen,"^^ and he holds that this
"all-inclusive category" of Nature may be known through the
application of the scientific method, ^2
Harold A. Larrabee has the same conception of nature
47. Brightman, ITP, 390.
48. Neilson (ed, ), WID, s,v. "mechanical," "mechanics."
49. Randall, art.(1944),
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid
.
62. Ibid.
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and he, too, regards mind as a part of an all-inclusive
physical nature. "There are no powers," he sa.ys, "prior
to the existence of their organs or independent of them.
Sterling P. Lamprecht says that "existence can be af-
firmed only of things within the spatial-temporal world,
"
and he specifically places mind within that world. Miss
Lavine asserts the "continuity between the 'lower' and the
'higher,' between the 'physical' and the 'human,' between
the 'biological' and the ' logical,
'
The same interpretation of nature finds expression
among the writings of outstanding naturalists who have not
been included in the Krikorian symposium. Roy Wood Sellers,
for example, looks apon nature as a self-sufficient system
—
"active, dynamic, relational and s elf-organi zing, "^^ as
"identical with existence and reality, "^'^ and as physical.
Ke writes:
Back of pomp and circumstance, back of love and
beauty and tragedy and happiness, lies--matter
.
In short, the physical is but another term for
being.
He "seeks to shov/ how man is a part of the fabric of the
53, Larrabee, art. (19^^).
6^. -amprecht, art. (19-^14)
.
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.
Lavine
, art
.
( 1944 )
.
56. Sellars, art. (1944),
57. Sellars, art. (1934),
58. Sellars, ^PR, 6.
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worlds "^^ he refers to mind as a "physical category;
"^0 and
he states that "That which is physical is real, and that
61
which is real is physical."
In An Encyc lopedia of Religion , Kenry Nelson V/ieman, who
is also among the foremost naturalists, defines nature as
"precisely the totality of all that is temporal and spatial
together with whatever possi.bilities this temporal and spa-
tial process may carry," Reality, he says, is what we ex-
perience, and experience
is impossible apart from space and time. In other
words, experience is necessarily and essentially
temporal and spatial. Therefore, an^/thing that we
can ever experience must be wome ouality, form, or
movement pertaining to temporal and spatial reality.
Since nature includes all temporal and spatial re-
ality together with all its possibilities, all that
we can ever experience must be nature,
Iredell Jenkins, in an article in Kunes * Dictionary
of Philosophy , says that the basis of the naturalistic
philosophical position is the belief that "the natural
v/orld is the whole of reality;" and that for the modern
naturalist there is "but one system or level of reality
• , . and this system is the totality of objects and e-
vents in space end time."^^ Inasmuch as space and time
69. Sellars, PPR, 1.
60. Sellars, ETT, 300.
61. Sellars, PPR, 13.
62. Wieman, art. C 1945).
63. Jenkins, art. (19^2),
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pertein to physical objects, Jenkins can mean only that
all existence is physical.
The foregoing statements regarding nature from the
pens of typical naturalists warrant the following comments:
The concept nature is a basic idea in naturalistic philoso-
phy. Nevertheless, many naturalists seem loath to be clear-
ly explicit as to just what they mean when they employ the
term nature, although upon the meaning of this word hinges
their metaphysical conclusions. An analysis of their asser-
tions, however, leads to certain inferences: (1) Natural-
ists believe nature to be the one original and fundamental
source of all that exists. (2) Either explicitly or implic-
itly, these naturalists regard nature, the ultimate reality,
as physical or material. (3) Although inclined to vague-
ness in connection with this basic principle, many natu-
ralists are remarkably and emphatically specific in affirm-
ing that consciousness or mind are but manifestations of
the biological organism, and are included in a nature
which is physical through and through. On this point these
naturalists
.^re definite; they seem to dwell upon it reso-
lutely. This reiterated insistence upon the inclusion of
mind in nature is all the more extraordinary in that it is
64.. Neiison (ed.), WID, s.v. "space," "time," "ex-tension." '
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redundant, for, to say that nature includes all,
is neces-
sarily to say that nature includes mind, mind being
a part
of all. However, the close attention to the problem
of
mind may be a healthy sign in naturalistic thought; it may
stem from a persistent awareness among these conscientious
and cogent thinkers that their monistic philosophy does not
adeouately explain the immediately experienced unioueness
of thought.
2, Definition of Naturalism
i. Definitions in General
As the word implies, naturalism designates the view
that nature is all of reality. As would be expected, the
confusion and ambiguity about the meaning of natur e are
maintained in the correlative word naturalism . S.D. Wiven
remarks upon "all the vagaries in its usege," and suras up
"the revived and modern acceptation" as
a certain type of WeItanschauung which has had
its upholders ever since the first rise of phi-
losophy. It includes all types of theory which
rule or try to rule out of consideration*^ whatever
is called "supernatural" or "spiritual" or tran-
scendent of experience. It attempts to tran-
scend materialism.^^
65. Niven, art. (1928)

In this brief aefinition, Niven has outlined some of
the
salient features of recent naturalism. He points out that
it is not a new system of thought, but "revived"—actually
as old as the earliest philosophic theory. He takes note
of the naturalistic denial of everything knovm as "super-
natural" or "spiritual." Inasmuch as philosophical discus-
sion embraces two orders of being, knovm as spiritual op-
posed to material , or as mind opposed to matter , or as su-
pernatura l opposed to natural, it follows that the speci-
fic denirl of the one im^.lies recognition only of the other
That is, Fiven says negatively that, in his interpretation,
naturalism is the belief that only the material has exis-
tence. In this connection, it is notev/orthy that natural-
ism attempts to differentiate itself from materialism;
Niven seems to suggest a Question as to the success of this
attemj,-t
.
In Webster there is a positive expression of the same
interpretation of naturalism. It is defined as
the doctrine which expands conceptions drawn from
the natural sciences into a world view, denying
that anjrt-hing in reaJ.ity has a supernatural or
more than natural si.gnificance; specif., the doc-
trine that cause-and-effect laws, such as those
of physics and chemistry, are adeouate to account
for all phenom.ena, and that teleological concep-
tions of nature are invalid.
66. ^^eilson (ed.), vmiD, s.v. "naturalism."

The mepnlnc- of this definition hinges upon the meaning of
"natural sciences." In generally recognized usage, the
natural sciences comprise those sciences which deal with
sensory data; they expressly do not include the sciences
of "abstract mathematics, philosophy, or metaphysics."
Kence, recording to v/ebster, naturalism begins with the
denial of all but sensory data: then, on this premise
limited to the recognition of only material objects, it
seeks to build a world view. Consistent with the premise,
the naturalistic conclusion is that only material objects
have reality: there is nothing immaterial or supernatural.
IMer the heading "Faturalismus, " Sisler gives a
similar definition. He vjrites:
der metaphysische
. . .
Faturalismus betrachtet
die TTatur als Inbegriff materieller Objekte oder
doch raum-zeitlicher, streng kausalgesetzmassig
zusamji3enh'^.ngender Vorgange—als die einzige oder
die wahre Re? lit/at: das Geistige gilt hier als
blosses ^odukt der Na.tur, als durchaus^.abhl^'ngig
von Naturpreschehen und von irgendeinem Ubernatur-
lichen kann nicht die Eede sein. Alles ist in
Bann der Natnrgesetzlichkeit eingeschlossen, auch
der ^/ensch.^°
Eisler, too, understands naturalism to be the belief that
the only true reality is nature regarded as consisting of
67. Feilson (ed.), mriT), s.v. "natural science," "phy-
sical science."
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material objects or spe tie 1-temporal events. Anything
called "spiritual" is a derivative of these sensible ob-
jects; the "supernatural" is nonexistent, ^tll reel ex-
istence, "even man," is included in a physical nature.
In Lalande's philosophical dictionarjr, naturalism is
defined as "la <3octrine pour laouelle il n'existe rien en
dehors de la Nature," fend, as previously indicated, na-
ture is "le monde materiel" as opposed " al 'Esprit, ^. Li-
berte, a Personjialit^. ""^^
Fuller, virpiting in Runes, is in eccord with the fore-
going authorities. He says that naturalism
holds that the universe reoulres no supernatural
cause or government, but is self-existing, self-
explanator3r, self-operating, and self-directing,
that the world-process is not teleological and
anfhropocentric, but purposeles, deterministic (ex-
cept for possible tychistic events), and only in-
cidentally productive of man; that human life, phy-
sical, mental, moral, and spiritual, is an ordinary
natural
' event attributable in all respects to the
ordinary operations of nature; and that man's ethi-
cal values, compulsions, activities, and restraints
can be justified on natural grounds without recourse
to s';pernatural sanctions ."^l
These recognized authorities apparently are in agreement
regarding the core of the naturalistic position. They
69. Lalande (ed.), VDP, s.v, "Natural i smus .
"
70. Ibid., s.v. "Nature."
71. Puller, art. (19^2).
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define it as the belief thrt all of reality ref^ides in
physical nature, a view trenchantly summarized as the "the-
ory thft physical nature (matter and its laws) is all that
there is or is a sufficient explanation of all,"'''^
ii. "Definitions by Recent Naturalists
On the dust jacket of Krikorian's work, the publisher
comments thst "there are almost as many definitions of natu-
ralism as there are writers of essays in this volume," and
one of these Vv^iters, S.T. Lamprecht, says that
the term "naturalism" is ordinarily used very vague-
ly and perhaps has no established meaning that all
who dub themselves naturalists would agree to accept. '^^
However, as would be expected in a philosophy so thor-
oughly permeated by the thought of one m?n, these natural-
ists are in accord concerning several basic issues of their
system, Krikorisn, in his preface, says that the "common
agreements, not so much in specific ideas as in general at-
titudes" are appav ent throughout the essays, Randall
feels *hat naturalists, despite their differences, may "lay
lay claim to "a position v/hich both negatively and posi-
tively is not lacking in precision , , , and to a community
72. Brightraan, TTP, 338.
73. Lamprecht, art. (19^4).
74. Krikorian (ed.), "Preface."
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of temper, of method, and of general outlook, "^^ The agree-
ments are revealed as the important basic beliefs which de-
termine the naturalistic metaphysics.
Dewey sets the pattern for the foundation of naturalism:
he says it is the
the theory that the whole of the universe or of ex-
perience may be accounted for by a method like that
of the physical sciences, and with recourse only to
current conceptions of physical and natural science;
more specifically, that mental and moral processes
may be reduced to terms and categories of the natu-
ral sciences. It is best defined negatively as that
which excludes everything distinctly spiritjial or
trans c endental , '
"
^±G excerpt provides the key for naturalistic thought:
it is an unoualified faith that "a method like that of the
physical sciences" is the sole and absolute source of any
knowledge, Dewey means to include every area of knowledge
thus far attempted by man, for he specifically mentions the
universe, experience, moral processes--thet is, values—and
mind or soul, and he states that all these are explicable
by the natural sciences. Inasmuch as the objects of the
natural sciences are by definition sinsory data,''"'' every ex-
istent is, in Dewey's view, reducible to sensory data, Iri
76, Randall, art, (1944),
76, Dewey, art. (19^0),
77, Neilson (ed.), WID, s,v, "natural science,"

the last sentence of the above-quoted passage, Dewey re-
affirms his belief that only sensible objects have ulti-
mate reality in his denial of everything "spiritual," that
is, of everjrthing "not material; incorporeal."'^^ Dewey's
definition of natixralism is consistent with his conception
of an all-inclusive, homogeneous nature.
Krikorian's definition notes the same fundamental ten-
ets of naturalistic thought. He vrrites:
For naturalism as a philosophy the universal appli-
cability of the experimental method is a basic be-
lief, . . , The naturalist must proceed with the be-
lief that mental phenomena, like all other phenomena,
can be understood by means of the experimental method.
. . , Still another" basic belief that is characteris-
tic of naturalism is that nature is the whole of
reality,
. . .
The naturalist turns av/ay from super-
natural worlds. For him there is no supernature, no
transcendental world.
Krikorian describes the experimental method as objective,
and his discussion shov/s that by "objective" he means to re
fer to sensory objects. In according unlimited application
to the method of sensory data, he implies that the "v.'hole o
realitAr" is sensible or physical; he pointedly includes
mind in the all which is physical nature; and, consistently
he rejects everything supernatural.
Miss Lavine expresses the same point of view. In her
78. Neilson (ed.), ^"TTrm, s.v. "spiritual," "material,'
"corporeal," "matter,"
79, Krikorian, art. (1944),
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essay, "the principle of continuity" is called "the nerve
of the naturalistic position," and it recuires that the sci-
entific method be employed in the "investigation into all
problems in all subject matters." She believes that
Naturalism has no essential tenets beyond the
principle of continuity of analysis. . . , "Con-
tinuity" of analysis can . . . mean only that all
analysis must be scientific analysis.
Lamprecht gives no specific definition, but his arti-
cle sets forth his philosophy as founded upon the belief
that all existence is the proper oBject for investigation
by the natural sciences.
W.R. Dennes sums up the naturalistic position thus:
Contemporary naturalism recognizes . . , that the
distinction from other philosophical positions lies
in the postulates and procedures which it criticizes
and reflects rather than in any positive tenets of its
own about the eosmos. ... It leaves to ordinax-y
scientific observation and inference all Questions as
to what the patterns and processes in the world prob-
ably are. Its spirit in these respects is very close
to the spirit of traditional and more specifically
materialistic naturalism. Both are protests against
all philosophies which allege that events recuire,
for their explanation, reference to transcendental
grounds, orders, causes, purposes, Dinge an sich . or
the like.^^
Here again is the assertion that the pivotal conviction of
80. Lavine, art. (1944),
81. Lamprecht, art, (1944).
82. Dennes, art. (1944).
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naturalistic thought is faith in the scientific method as
the exclusive avenue to knowledge, with the logically nec-
essary denial of everything above or beyond those things
manifest to the senses, Dennes goes so far as to remark
frankly upon the materialistic character of this naturalism,
Wleman asserts that the basis of naturalism is "a cer-
tain method of inquiry" the data of which consist in "any-
thing that can be experienced. He claims that knowledge is
attainable only
by discovering how events (happenings) are related
to one another, or how they might possibly be re-
lated. Therefore, all the reality we can ever know
must be made up of interconnected happenings and
their possibilities, , , . Naturalism holds that
all actual reality is necessarily temporal and spa-
tial,
He places the basis of naturalism in method, and he views
all reality as temporal and spatial, that is, physical,
Sellars has developed an "evolutionary naturalism"
which he calls a. "reformed materialism:"
It goes without saying that I am not seeking
to revsurrect an outmoded type linked insepapably
with an outgrown, form of physics, Democritean
or classical. Fo; it must be a reformed materi-
alism which is Dhilosophically and scientifically
sophisticated.^
83. Wieman, art. (19^5),
84, Sellars, art. (19^3,
I
63
Sellars, too, stresses the significance of science as the
sole determinant of philosophical conclusions, which, he
believes, must change to accord with advancing scientific
knowledge. This view is identical with Dewey's idea that
the universe is comprehensible "with recourse only to cur-
rent conceptions of physical and natural science,"
Certain facts emerge from a consideration of these de-
finition of naturalism. Implicit in the naturalistic con-
cept of nature is the definition of naturalism accepted
both by recognized general authorities and by representa-
tive naturalistic sources, Naturalism may be defined as
the doctrine that physical nature constitutes all of reality
including mind. The naturalists themselves are dogmatic in
holding that all knowledge derives from the method of the
natural sciences; the crux of the naturalistic philosophy
is this uncualified belief in the exclusive validity of the
scientific method as the sole source of all knowledge and
truth. From their unvarying adherence to this crucial prin-
ciple follows their repudiation of everything extramaterial,
that is, of all that is known as mental or spiritual or
supernatural or transcendental.

3. Definition of Supernatiiralisra
i. Definitions in General
Et3nnolocyically, the word supernatural is derived from
the I«tin forms super, above, and nature , nature, and this
etymological meaning is maintained in the generally ac-
cepted meaning of the term. In 'Webster, supernatural is
defined thus:
Of, belonging or having reference to, or proceed-
ing from, an''order of existence beyond nature, or
the visible and observable universe: divine as op-
posed to human or spiritual as opposed to material;
as , , . the supernatural character of the soul. .
, .
Ascribed to agencies or powers above or beyond
nature or based upon such an ascription; brought
about, initiated, made operative, etc., by means
that trapscend the lav's, or observed secuences of
nature. °^
This definition presupposes the usage of natur e in the spe-
cific sense of reference to the physical world, and not in
the naturalistic sense of reference to all of reality. Web-
ster's intention to differentiate clearly between the natu-
ral and the supernatural is apparent in his treatment of
natur e as synonymous with the "visible or observable uni-
verse," an expression which can mean only sensory objects
accessible to more than one knower; and in his affirmation
86, TTeilson (ed.), WFID, s.v, "supernatural."

of two orders of being, the "spiritual ss opposed to mate-
rial," and not only one order as postulated by the natural-
ists; and in his particularization of the "character of the
soul" by the terra supernatural , thereby implying the tradi-
tional distinction of the soul from things which are natu-
ral or corporeal or physical . The entire definition indi-
cates a taken-for-granted recognition of an order of exis-
tence other then, that of nature.
Accordingly, Webster defines supernatural! sm as
any doctrine or creed that asserts the realit^r of
an existence beyond nature and the control andguidance of nature and men by an invisible power
or powers,^'
This definition goes further than the preceding one in that
it asserts a reality beyond nature and imputes a control-
ling power to an invisible being.
Other authoritative sources present the same interpre-
of su£eniaturansi2 Eisler defines Supernaturalismus as
"der Glaube an eine iibernatu'rliche Offenbarung, " and uber-
Mturlich he places in contradistinction to natu^lichfthe
word OffetoM suggests the added idea of revelation or
manifestaUon, which,, however, could be understood as
sl: Ssier" ^I'^l f "Bupernaturalism."
nattirlich."' ' ' "^^Pei-naturalismus ; " -(ti,'er^
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implicit in Webster's statement.
In Lalande, supernsturalisme is said to be a "croyance
a des faits surnaturels, " and surneturel is defined as "Qui
est au-(3es6us de la nature," natur e, as noted in previous
discussion, being "1' ensemble des etres connus per les
sens."^^
Guthrie says that tne supernatural is that v/hich "sur-
passes the active and exactive powers of nature. "^^ Simi-
larly, Professor Ormond understands supernaturalism as the
doctrine that the world, including mc.n, is to be
referred, in the Isst analysis, to a being who in
his nature and pov.^er transcends the world and can-
not be identified with its forces and operations .^-^
411 these authorities convey the same interpretation
of superna tur a li sm as being the doctrine which asserts a
reality which transcends the recognized powers of physical
nature,
ii. Naturalistic Concept
Dewey provides the pattern for the naturalistic concep-
tion of supernatur a lism
. He simply denies the existence of
anything beyond nature. In saying that "the whole of the
S9. Lalande (ed.), VDP. s.v. "supernaturalisrae; " "sur-
naturel:" "nature:"
90. Guthrie, art. (1942).
91, Ormond, art, (1940).
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universe" may be explained by the natural eciencevS, he im-
plicitly rejects any reality beyond nature. But regarding
this point Pewey is explicit. He says that naturalism is
"best defined" as a system v/hich repudiates everything "spir-
itual or transcendental:"^^ he decries the "encumbrances" of
supernaturalism and looks forward to "emancipation" from
them. In his viev/, the supernatural is nonexistent.
This doctrine of a denial of everything knovm as su-
pernatural or spiritual is a persistent and characteristic
theme in the thought of these recent naturalists, Costello
says, "Thei e is no 'supernatural, ' "^"^ Sidney Hook vvrites
that "the naturalist denies the existence of supernatural
pov/ers.
. . .
LTaturalism is opposed to all knomi forms of
supernaturalism,"^^ Randall Quotes and applauds Dewey's
assertion that naturalism has "no place for 'spirit' and
'spiritualism,'" and declares further that naturalism is
"in fundamental opposition to all forms of supernatural*.
illBm, - Krikorian states that "the naturalist turns away
from these supernatural worlds. For him there is no super-
nature, no transcendental world, "^'^ Larrabee asserts that
92. Dewey, art, (19^0),
93. Dewey, QP, 2.
94. Costelio, art.(l94a),
96. Hook, art. (1944).
96. Randall, art. (1944).
97, PCrikorian, art. (1944)^
1
"supernaturalism has overstayed its era,"^^
Sellarv«?, too, consistent with his view of nature as
self-sufficient and independent, denies the supernatural.
Believing that all reality is physical, he accords no re-
ality to anything supernatural.^^ He urp"es that v/e "out-
PTow the false notions" pertaining" to the supernatural, 1^*^
for the existence of which there is lack of evidence. '^^
The tv/o opposed conceptions of nature discussed in the
first section of this chapter lead to the tv/o positions re-
garding supernaturalism. On the one hand, those viho hold
that nature means all of reality, must hold also that there
is nothinp- beyond nature: for them the term supernatural is
meaningless, or else it is synonymous with nothing
. Logi-
cally, the all-inclusive definition of natur e could embrace
within the natural, all that has ever been meant by super-
natural: actually, as will be Bho\m in Chapter recent
naturalists attempt this to a degree. On the other hand,
those who believe that na ture means the created part of re-
ality, the physical universe, believe that above and beyond
nature there is another order of existence which they call
the supernatural .
98. Larrabee, art. (19^^)
99. Sellars, ^'PR, f.
10^. Sellars, ^tsr,' 7!
101. Sellars, RCA, 1^17.
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4. Charrct.eristic Features of Recent Naturalism
i. Scientific '^^ethod: Crux of Naturalistic Thought
The definitions of naturalism already discussed dis-
close thr-t the nucleus of naturalistic philosophy consists
in an undeviating faith in the sole and exclusive validity
of scientific method ss the criterion of truth and knowl-
edge. The definitions by the naturalists, already noted,
invariably include assertions of this absolute reliance up-
on the natural sciences: for example, Pewey^s theory that
"current conceptions of physical and natural science" pro-
vide an adequate explanation of all of reality;^ or Kri-
korian's declaration that everj/-thing "can be understood by
means of the exT)erimental method, " by which, his discussion
reveals, he means sensor3r data;-'-^'^ or Miss Lavine's state-
ment that "all problems in all vSiibject matters" should be
investigated by the scientific method;-'-^^ or Laraprecht's re-
ferral of all questions concerned v'ith ultimate reality to
"ordinary scientific observation and inference, "105
The writing-s of recent naturalists insist upon this piv-
otal naturalistic principle. It is an unfailing point of em-
phasis throughout the Krikorian volume. Professor Ramdall,
102. Dewey, art, (19^0).
103. Krikorian, art. (19^4),
104. Lavine, art.(1944).
10v5, Lamprecht, art, (194-^).
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having stressed the fundaraentPl iinportence of the scienti-
fic method in hie own viev/, points out that
the in5=istence on the universal and unr-estricted
application of scientific method iS^a theme per-
vading every one of these essays,
To note a few of the tltenchant expressions of this
"theme:" "The naturalism of these younger m.en is nothing if
not scientific method critically aware of its assumptions
and implications, "'•^'^ is a statement which represents natu-
ralism and scientific method as virtually equivalent. Natu-
ralism, it is said, stands or falls "with its acceptance of
8 strictly empirical method and its refusal to believe a
matter of great m.oment when no evidence can be found, "-^^^
"There is for naturalism no knowledge except that of the type
ordinarily called 'scientific. ' "^^^ "Naturalism , , . is
based on modern scientific methods. "-^-^^ "A naturalistic ap-
proach involves , . . designation of empirical material , . .
and continued testing in terms of this material," and
insistence on such testing is part of the natural-
istic stress on the primacy of matter. , . .Reli-
ance on scientific method, together with an
10<o, Randall, art.(194^).
107. Ibid.
1^8. Lamprecht, art. (19^^).
109. Dennes, art. (19^^).
lie. Nagel, art, (194^).
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appreciation of the primacy of matter and the
pervcSivenesB of chancre, I take to be the cen-
tra 1 points of naturalism as a philosophic out-
look,
Of the three "central points" of naturalism mentioned in
this excerpt, tv/o derive from "reliance on scientific meth-
od," for scientific method can lead to a knowledge only of
matter, an essential Quality of which is the "pervasive-
ness of chanp-e." Naturalists in p-enertl apparently agree
with Randall when he s?ys that "contemporary naturalism is
rooted in the natur?l sciences, "'-•^^ and with Dewey when he
wTites that "Ttiere is but one method for ascertaining fact
and truth, --th-^t conveyed by the word 'scientific. ' "•^^*^
The crucial significance of the scientific method in
naturalistic philosophy makes the meaning of scientifi c
method a primarv'- issue. On this point there seems, at
times, to be a tendency to obscurity in naturalistic viTit-
ings. The insistence by naturalists that their m.ethod be
extended even to objects such as mind and values, tradition-
ally regarded as supersensible, suggests that possibly the
meaning of scientific method may have been expanded to in-
clude, for example, the function of reason in the idealis-
tic sense, and is not restricted to the investigation of
111, Edel, art. (19^4),
112, Randall, art, (19''34)
,
113, Dewey, CF, 33.

sensory data. Despite this seeming uncertainty, which v/ill
receive detailed treatment in Chapter TV, there is abundant
evidence that naturalists construe scientific method as the
method of the physical and natural sciences, Edel expressew
value in terms of physics, "^^"^ Dennis' "inductive inference'
turns out to be physical in character, -^-^^ as does Krikorian
interpretation of mind .-^-*-^ Lamprecht says that "the quali-
tative nature of a thing is vfhat empirically it is found to
117be," and, in Bertocci's phrase, empirical meens "check-
able-by-sense,"-^-^^ V»ieman declares that the naturalistic
"method of inauir^r" reveals that only events have actual ex-
istence, and that analysis shows an event to be "necessari-
ly temporal and. spatial, "^^^ that is, physical,
Dewey, too, is explicit regarding his meaning of the
scientific method which he identifies wdxh the experimen-
tal method. He asserts that "effective and integral think-
ing is possible only where the experimental method in some
form is used,"^^<^ and that "scientific procedure is actual
knowing" as contrasted vlth other and inferior types, ^^l
for it provides "the sole dependable means of disclosing
11^, Edel, art.( 194-^0.
115. Dennes, art. (19^4),
116. Krikorian, art. (194^).
117. Lamprecht, art.(19^A)!
118. Bertocci, art. (19^7),
119. Wieman, art. (1945).
120. Dewey, QC, 2d; m'lT. 99.
121. Dev/ey, QC, 85, 86.

the realities of existence. "122 He says that modern
sci-
ence is "a recognition thPt no ides is entitled to be
termed
knowledp:e till it has passed into such overt manipulation of
physical conditions as constr^.icts the object to which the
idea refers, "^^^ He holds that "the first reauirement of
scientific procedure tisl full publicity as to materials and
processes. "12"* The scientific method, he avers, is the pro-
cedure of "makinc^ hx'potheses which are then tried out in ac-
tual experimental change of physical conditions, "^^^ He dis-
regards as "meaningless" whatever is "couched in terms of
something not open to public inspection and verification,"
or to "common observation and description, "1^6 y_q accepts
those matters vfhich "are capable of being tested by empirical
evidence, since they all refer to things that are observ-
able," and he seeks statements "in veritable propositions
. , . capable of empirical test," recognizing only the "in-
terpretation vhich is empirically verifiable," He writes:
a public and manifest series of definite opera-
tions-, all capable of public notice and report, dis-
tinguishev^: scientific knoving from the knowing car-
ried on by inner 'mental' processes accessible only
to introspection, or inferred by dialect from as-
sumed premises.!^'''
12^. Dev.rev, art. (1930).
123, Dewey, art. (1908).
12^. Dewey, TV, 22.
125. Dev/ey, EAF, 155.
126. Dewey, T\/, 10, 11.
127. Dewey, OC, 128, 129,
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The forego inf? discussion indicates thpt the crux of
the naturalistic philosophy rests in the fundamental dogma
of unqualified dependence upon the scientific rnethod ?£ the
exclusive criterion of knowledge. Regarding the meaning of
scientific method , there seems at times to be a lack of clar-
ity stemming from the naturalists* insistence that their
method be extended to areas, such as value, hitherto admit-
tedly outside of the physical realm. Kowever, this vagueness
is dispersed, and scientific method stands forth as re-
stricted to the sensible objects of the phjrsical and natu-
ral sciences, a conclusion demanded by the naturalists' em-
phasis upon the necessity/ of conditions described as "overt
manipulation ©f physical conditions," overt being defined
as "open to viev/; public: apparent* manifest ; "-^28 qj» des-
cribed as requiring "full publicity as to materials and pro-
cesses," and publicity means "open to the observation or view
of all;"-^ •- or described as "concrete" v/hich is opposed to
ideal or as "empirical," meaning "checkable-by-sense"-^^-^
and defined thus in Runes: "In scientific method . . , !|iav-
ing' reference to actuality, "^^^ while, in the same source,
actuality is said to mean "existence in space and time."-'-^*^
128. ^Teiison (ed.), s.v. "overt."
129. Ibid
. , s.v. "publicity:" "public.
130. Ibid.
, s.v. "concrete."
131. Bertocci, art. (19^7).
132. Feibleman, art. (1942).
133. Cairns, art. (19^2),
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In thus confining themselves to sensory data, natu-
ralists give insufficient consideration to some of the most
vivid and powerful experiences of life. They devote insuffi-
cient attention to the deeper aspects of pe. sonality, such as
memory and anticipation, or purpose, or the incontrovertibly
intuited ideal vneralues of truth, justice, goodness, and love;
and they do not note that these ideal values, or the lack of
them, formulate the ends of men's actions, while physical na-
ture provides only the means, ^^^^^ i1iey assign inadequate ira-
portnce to human character, and to the need of rational mastery
of the will in the realm of choice, if science is to inure
to the betterment and not to the destruction of mankind. They
overlook that higher part of the universe into which "the fur-
ther limits of our being plunte" ... an altogether different
dimension of existence from the sensible and "merftly under-
standable" world , . . the source of most of our ideal im-
pulses which possess us in "a way for which we cannot articu-
lately account, "^'^^^^ --experiences infinitely less hollow
than the findings of the physical and natural sciences. Natu-
ralists, on the whole, have concentrated upon the area of life
133a. Brierhtman, NV, 47.
133b. ^'ames, VEE, 515-619,
133c. Ibid., 500.
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susceptible to sensory verification, and have then denied
reality to those experiences which transcend their precon-
ceived criteria.
ii, A Doctrine of Rejection
The naturalistic faith in the exclusive validity of the
scientific method implies the corollary doctrine of rejection.
This doctrine of rejection is an integral component of natu-
ralistic philosophy, and is embedded either explicit^ or im-
plicitly in each of the definitions of naturalism discussed
in the second section of this chapter,
Naturalists tend to be insistent and emphatic regarding
this negative position of denial, Dennes, for example, as
already noted, finds the distinctive mark of naturalistic
philosophy "in the postulates and procedures which it re-
jects rather th?n in any positive tenets of its own,"
Naturalists deny all that is extramaterial; hence, they dog-
matically reject everything kno\m as supernatural^^ transcen-
dental, mental, or spiritual, for these concepts cannot be
verified by the method of the natural sciences. Among the
specific assertions by naturalists, previously mentioned,
is Dewey's outright repudiation of all called "spiritual or
134, Supra , 61,
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trsnvscendental;" or Costello's statement that "there is no
* supernatural; ' " or Randall's assertion that naturalism
"stands in fundamental opposition to all forms of super-
naturalism,"^^^
Krikoripn sets forth the position unequivocally. He
says that
the irrportance of the naturalist's belief that na-
ture is the whole of reality lies not only in what
it affirms but in what it denies. It denies v.^at a
philosopher like J, Maritain mxintFins: 'There is a
spiritual, metaphysical order sniper i or to external
nature , , , above all mechanism and lav's of the ma-
terial world,' This order 'is no part of this uni-
verse , , . it rises above the created v.-orld, the
sensible and the supra-sensible, ' And above this or-
der there is also the order of grace, and 'this is
entirely supernatural,' The naturalist turns avv^ay
from thesp supernatural worlds,-^*^^
Fere is a frank denial of everything" "superior to external na-
ture" or above the "laws of the material world."
^lany naturalists are particularly specific regarding
the elimination of ^-od in their philosophy, Costello de-
clares that "f^od and immortality are m^z-ths, , , , The natu-
ralist exclaims, 'Thank ^od, that illusion is gone, ' "-'^'^
S idney I o ok v/r it e s
:
The existence of f^^od, immortality, disembodied
135. eupra , 67.
13^. Krikorian, art. (1944)
137, Costello, art. (1944),
If
I
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spirits, cosmic purpose and design, as these have
been customarily interpreted by the great insti-
tutional religions, are denied by naturalists for
the same generic reasons that they deny the exis-
tence of fairies, elves, and leprechauns,
This is a wholesale repudiation of the great truths of the
Christian religions, justified by B?ofessor Hook "because
no plausible evidence has been found to warrant belief in
the entities and powers to which supernatural status has
been attributed," By "no plausible evidence" Professor
Hook means no "scientific evidence" of the existence of ex-
trasensory perception, 1*^^
Randall says that "there is no room for any Supernatural
in naturalism—no supernatural transcendental God and no^ per-
sonal survival after death. "^^^
Lamprecht declares that "the existence of God in the
sense of a person is an open possibility," and that theism
is "a matter of great moment." He disagrees with those natu-
ralists who
not infrequently have been prone to toss off the
remark that the existence of God is quite unim-
portejit one v/ay or the other, 141
His essay, "Naturalism and Religion," is devoted to the
138, Hook, art. (1944).
139, Ibid .
140, Randall, art. (1944).
141, Lamprecht, art. (1944).
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thesis that lack of empirical v/arrant renders untenable the
idea of the existence of Ood, and he concludes that reli-
gion should be taken "with a sense of humor,"
John Dewey's article, "Antinatijralism in Extremis,"
called a "polemic" by Professor Randall, is dedicated to
justifying" the "fact that naturalism has no place for , . .
'spirit' and 'spiritualism.'" The justification carries
"the battle into the heart of the enemy's camp" in that it
consists largely in a singularly satirical attack on reli-
gion, coupled vvith the theme that supernaturalists display
a "systematic disrespect for scientific method" to the point
of denying "the findings of science when the latter conflict
with any of the dogmas of their creed. "-^"^^ Regrettably,
Professor Dewey offers no specific instances of such denial
of scientific achievement,
Sidney Hook assails "the two cardinal propositions of
natural theology/-, namely, 'C^od exists' and 'Man has an im-
mortal soul." Ke decries the "failure of nerve" which, it
is said, reveals itself in "a conversion of the soul to God"
and in the "belief that rrr^;-th and mj^steries are modes of
knowledge," and which "exhibits itself as a loss of confidence
1^2, Dewey, art. (1944).
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in scientific method." He says that the naturalist who
is frithful to his method must assert that for
every traditional conception of f^-od, the weight
of evidence so fer is decidedly in the negative.
-^^^
Because God does not reveal Himself within the limits
circumscribed by scientific but finite minds, then, for
naturalists, God does not exist. There is a striking tenden-
cy among naturalists to "toss off" God and religion by rele«c
gating them to the realm of "congenial but unverifiable myths
masquerading as literal truths; "144 or of "myths and mys-
teries ^"l^^ or of "ghosts and spirits, unicorns and dra-
gons ;"1'^^ or of "fairies, elves, and leprechauns : "^^'^ or
of "a gingerbread castle on the other side of the moon,"!^^
Reflection of mind in the traditionally accepted sense
of an immaterial entity, like rejection of the supernatural,
is intrinsic to naturalistic thought and is emphasized in
authoritative definitions of naturalism such as those dis-
cussed in the second section of this chapter. The natural-
istic concept of mind is well epitomized by Devv'ey when he
says that "mental and moral processes may be reduced to
143, Eook, art. (1944).
1-^
. •»-'arrab e e , art , ( 1944 )
,
1^6, Fook, art. (194^),
146, Schneider, art. (19^4).
147. Hook, art. (1944).
1-^8. Ibid.
fI
terms and categories of the natural sciences;"-^ ^ and by
other naturalists in statements such as "Mental phenomena
like all other phenomena, can be understood hy means of the
experimental method."-'-^ This naturalistic concept of mind
as a part of an all-inclusive homogeneous nature will re-
ceive detailed attention in Chapter J\f of this work, the
point of emphasis here being the doctrine of rejection as
an integral feature of naturalistic philosophy.
This doctrine of rejection consists in a general and
persistent flat denial of all supersensible existence. Nat-
uralists repudiate everything knov/n as supernatural, spiri-
tual, and transcendental^ They disavov/ the existence of
God, the reality of soul or mind save as a physical cate-
gory, and the doctrine of immortality.
iii. Agreements and Divisions in Faturalistic Thought
Krikorian, in the preface of his work, calls attention
to the "common agreements, not so much in specific ideas as
in general attitudes"!^! apparent throughout the essays.
Randall considers that naturalists in general possess "a
community of temper, of method, and even of general outA
look. "^^2 He regards "a naturalistic method as the starting
l^r9. Dewey, art. (19^0).
160. Krikorian, art. (194^).
161. Krikorian (ed.), "Preface."
162. Randall, art. (19^-^).
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as the starting point of genuine philosophizing," and he
holds that "within a naturalistic framework there is room
for distinctive emphases" at times becoming sharpened into
philosophic issues which divide American naturalistic
thought.
Erneet Tagel v-rites of "many of the sharp divisions be-
tween professed naturalists," and asserts that
disagreements ajnong those professing nature lism is
not a source of embarrassment to them, since natu-
ralism is not a tightly integrated system of phi-
losophy,
H.A. Lerrabee views naturalism as "the slow growth of an at-
titude rather xiirm of a specific philosophical doctrine, Ke
says that naturalists "may differ in many details
. , . but
they agree in "rejecting whatever is not verifiable b^^ sci-
entific method. -^55
H.T. Costello asserts that "the new naturalism ha.s at
least one reductionist or liquidationist theor^^; "There is
no 'supernatural,'
, . , Otherwise I do not find any great
unity among these nevj nattiralists, "^^^
These statements by naturalists indicate that the firet
in importance of their "commvon agreements" is identical with
153. Randall, art.(194i^),
15^, rafrel, art, (19^4),
155, Larrabee, art, (19^^).
156. Costello, art. (194^).
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their basic belief in the exclnsive validity of the scien-
tific method. From this stems another common agreement,
namely, the view of their system as "the slow growth of en
attitur'e,". or, as Yiss Lavine puts it, in a period of for-
mulation prohibitive of "an adequate account" at the present
time.-'-^'^ This characteristic attitude of tentativeness is
in accord v-ith Dewe^r's conclusion that "the quest for cer-
tainty" is futile, because future scientific achievements
may allter the "facts" of the moment.
However, naturalists do not adhere consistently to their
principle of tentativeness, Curi-^uslj/- enough, it is v;ith
reference to their doctrines of negation- -which could not
possibly fulfill the conditions of scientific method- -that
they are utterly dogmatic and completely lacking in any hint
of tentativeness. It v/ould be difficult to imagine a more
dogmatic statement than Costello's assertion: "There is no
supernatural:" and it is all the more significant in that it
is the sole point of unity which he finds am-ong the recent
naturalists. -^^^ Such a position suggests the possibility
that the primaj^y goal of naturalism may be the disposition
of God, the scientific method serving as a plausible instrument.
157. Lavine, art. (194^).
158. Costello, art. (19^^).
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Nevertheless, netura lists dwell with remarkable cer-
titude upon their negative tenets. Larrabee mentions the
differing views among naturalists, and notes one point of
agreement among them: their rejection of everything unveri-
fiable by the scientific method. -^^^ As already pointed out,
a salient point in the definitions of naturalism is the de-
nial of everything supernatural, spiritual, or transcenden-
tal. In Hastings, for example, naturalism is defined as
"ruling out" these concepts Webster says that they are
"denied; "^'^^ Ferm discountenances "recourse to supernatu-
ral sanctions ; "1^2 Bev/ey asserts that naturalism "is best
defined negatively as that v/hich excludes everything dis-
tinctly spiritual or transcendental. "1*53 Naturalists ex-
plicitly deny the existence of God, of cosmic purpose and
design, of mind or soul, and of immortality. Their nega-
tive doctrine of rejection has been shovm to be intrinsic
to their philosophy and is regarded as a distinctive fea-
ture of their system.
'^he divisions among naturalists appear among the less
basic aspects of their system, and in no v/ay affect the ri-
gidity of their decisive fundamental tenets. One of the
169. Larrabee, Brt,(19AA)
,
160. Niven, art. (19^^-).
1^1. Neilson (ed.), WID, s.v. "naturalism."
162. Fuller, art. (1942).
163. Dewey, art. (19^0).
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most irrportant divisions stems from two different approaches
to man's scientific knowledge of Nature. The issue lies be-
tween the structuralists and the functionalists. For the
structuralists, the setting of physical science is in JJhy-
sics; for the functionalists, physical science has a bio-
logical setting. For the structuralists, explanation is
sought in the ultimate categories of mathemetics and mathe-
matical physics; for the functionalists, explanation is
sought in the activities of living beings adjusting to their
environment. "But in a deeper sense the reconciliation has
already been effected" because the structuralists accept
the theory of creative evolution.
The philosophies of physics have been forced by
their ovm subject-matter—the field—to adopt tem-
poral and functional categories simil&r to those
the biological and social sciences had already de-
rived from theirs.
Thus it appears that there has been a m.eeting of minds re-
garding the difference of opinion v/hich "till the last de-
cade seemed perhaps the most important division within nat-
uralistic thought. "^^^
Another division among naturalists is a contemporary
version of the same issue. It lies between those naturalists
16^. P.andall, art. (194^),
166. Ibid.
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who "trenslate all issues into methodological terms" and
those who explain all problems in the "language of experi-
ence," The essayist concludes that "in the last analysis
. . .
when sufficiently critical and sophisticated" the two
positions "seem rather like alternative vjays of construing
the same fact. . . . There is little ultimate difference."
Professor Randall places the divisions in naturalis-
tic thought in the proper perspective when he nays that
they exist "within a naturalistic framev/ork." The "frai-ne-
wofek" may be viewed as the naturalists' undeviating faith
in the exclusive validity of the scientific method, v/hich
constitutes the dogmatic determinant of all their philo-
sophical conclusions. Their differences are revealed as
relatively superficial; they are submerged in the unity of
£ universal adherence to their method, which, hy defini-
tion, admits oiily sensible objects.
5. Comparison of Recent ^^aturalism with Traditional Materialism
i. Points of Departure
(1) Changed Concept of './latter
. Recent naturalism
seeks to transcend materialism, a distinction regarded by
Professor Randall as a characteristic mark of his philosophy.
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He lookvS upon
the i(?entification of ^naturalism' with the double
protest, against nineteenth-century materialism as
well as a,orainst supernaturalism and transcendental
idealism ... as the christening, if not the be-
getting of the 'new' or 'contemporary' naturalism.
Dev^ey, too, attempts to differentiate sharply between
recent naturalism and traditional materialism, ^e severely
criticizes those antinftura lists who, he says, erroneously/-
identify
naturalism with 'materialism' and then employ the
identification to charge naturalists with reduc-
tion of all distinctively human values, moral, aes
thetic, logical, to bljnd' mechanical conjunctions
of material entities,-'-^
Dewey, apparently, is objecting to the traditional material-
istic atomism. With Sellars, he is denying an "outmoded
type linked inseparably with an outgrown form of physics. "l^S
Similarly, Dennes views the distinction between natural-
ism and the older -materialism as paralleling the changed con-
cept of matter ensuing upon recent scientific investigation.
He wites that
materialism is a position for which there is no
evidence, if 'materialism' we mean the doctrine
166. Randall, art. (19^^).
167. Dewey, art. (19^^).
16B. Sellars, art. (19^3).
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that the ultimfte constituents ere extended, h&rd,
more or less heav^/, indestructible, and in motion. -"-^-^
Bennes, like Sellars, seems to admit to a broader meaning of
mrterialism denoting a view not restricted solely to a con-
cept contingent upon an exploded scientific theory, for both
reject materialism only as it means the solid-atom theory.
In thus differentiating their position from that of the
older materialists, the modern naturalists are consistently
in accord with their ruling principle of reliance upon sci-
entific method. The distinction consists in the changed con-
cept of matter approved by current scientific research. The
traditional materialists, v/ith the scientists of their time,
conceived matter as composed of indestructible particles;
the recent naturalists, with the contemporary^ scientists,
have discarded the old atom theory, and have substituted
their conception of matter as active energy/, explaining na-
ture as a process of creative evolution. Professor Hook is
explicit regarding this identification of naturalistic phi-
losophy with scientific theory:
The differences between naturalists in the his-
tory of thought can be easily/- explained in ter!ns
of (1) varying conceptions of what fields and pro-
blems are amenable to scientific treatment and (2)
169. Dennes, art. (194^).
I
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progressive refinements in the methods of inquiry
theme elves , ^"^^
The view that naturalism transcends materialism is com-
bined v:ith emTDhasis upon a "striking shift in the basic
categories
. , , employed in naturalistic x-'^ilosophy, " In
the essay, "The Categories of ^'aturalism',' Professor Dennes
presents a thoroughgoing anal3rsis of this im.portant aspect.
VHien science regarded nature as an atomic "system of tiny
Jbilliard balls," naturalism conformed by establishing
matter, enevg\r, end motion as the basic categories. V/ith
the current scientific explanation of creative evolution,
naturalism adapts itself by "the recent shift in the basic
categories ... to events, qualities, and relations."
Dennes says that "one cannot say strictly what one
means by 'event' or 'quality' or 'relation' . . . which
contemporary naturalism takes to be the constituents of all
that occurs, of all that exists." However, an event is any-
thing which happens" and "nothing in the world" exists ex-
cept "events and their qualities and relations."
That nothing croes on and no human argument implies,
or even makes sense of, any notion that events re-
quire for their occurrence or for their explanation
any grounds, controlling orders, laws, principles.
170. Dennes, art. (19^^).
171. Handall, art. (19^^:^ )
.

causes, purposes, values which are anything more
than further stretches of events.
The categories of traditional materialism possessed such
attributes as "extended, hard, heavy, and in motion, as
well as indestructible," The categories of recent natu-
ralism, on the contrary, are conceived as entirely free
from any specific attribute with the single exception of
process; the qualities and relations of any "event" are
left to science. The three basic categories designate
"aspects of existence" and they always exist concomitantly;
"no instance of any of these aspects exists apart from in-
stances of other aspects, "^'^^^
The naturalistic category of event is a significant
advance toward the idealistic concept of ultimate reality
as activity. ^"^^^ The idealists, Leibniz, Berkeley, and
Bowne, for example, assert that only the active is real;
reality consists in action, in change, Leibniz, in his
Monadology ^ teaches that reality is composed of active in-
dividuals, called monads , which function in "preconceived
harmony;" "quod non agit, non existit, ""'''^^^ Berkeley held
172, Dennes, art, (1944),
172a, Ibid ,
172b, For a further discussion of this point, see
infra, 112 and 117,
172c. Supra , 14; Brightman, ITP, 116-119.
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that only God, the Supreme Spirit, and finite spirits are
real; that a spirit is an active, incorporeal, undivided
entity; and that things exist only in the action of a per-
ceiving spirit, ^'^^^ Bowne asserts that being is activity, ^'^^^
and that there is "no substantial nature, but only natural
events, "^'''^^ IfetureJ-ists and idealists agree in denying
a core of being, and are in accord in viewing reality as
active energy: Leibniz calls his center of energy a monad;
Berkeley's active entity is termed a spirit; Bowne affirms
the active to be the real; both Bowne ajid the recent natu-
ralist look upon nature as a series of events. The passing
of the indestructible solid atom has marked the disappear-
ance of an impass e between idealism and naturalism,
Nevertheless, the categories of naturalism, like those
of materialism, refer to sensory data. They name "sets of
occurrences which are visible or audible or otherwise sensible,"
If, for example, the concept of body is examined
—
a concept that was a basic category in earlier natu-
ralism—the modern naturalist would ask: Vfhet do we
observe, compare (including measuring) manipulate,
and infer when we deal with bodies? ^Vhat but con-
figurations of qualities occurring and persisting
(that is. more or less persistent) and standing in
"spatial" relations to other occurrent configura-feions.! '3
Both naturalist and materialist are concerned with the physical
172d. Supra
. 15, 21
172e. Supra
.
24.
172f. Infra, 121,
173, Dennes, art, (1944),
II
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object and investigates it in accordance v;ith the currently
accepted instruments of science; the recent naturalist is
distiA^ivShed in that he verbalizes his findings in terns
of the nevr categories.
In short, the distinction between recent naturalism and
traditional materialism is found in the achievements of mod-
ern science, which conceives physical nature as ultimately
constituted of active energy rather than of solid atoms. In
conformity with this scientific development, recent natural-
ism has substituted the new categories of events, qualities,
and relc tions for the former materialistic categories of
matter, motion, and energy,
(2) Changed Concept of the Scientific Method. Recent
naturalists believe that the new categories enable them to
investigate adequately areas of being closed to the older
materialists,
When nature v/as interpreted as "a purely mechanical sys-
tem of tiny billiard-balls following the lavvrs of dynamics,"
human life and mind were left outside nature, in an unintel-
ligible situation.
Iran's only relation with such a v^orld must be
exclusiveljr mechanical; when the small billiard-
ball hit him on the head, he could see stars.
. , , The varieties of human experience, reli-
gious, artistic, moral, even intellectual.
.i
became quite literally supernatural--they were in
no sense natural processes.^
The purely mechanical explanation 616 not lend itself to
an interpretation of the teleological and logical concepts
in human experience.
Stimulated by the evolutionists, the natural sciences
extended their range to include every aspect of man's ex-
perience, interpreting all in terms of interaction between
the organism and its environment. Mind came to be under-
stood as a biological organism completely explained by be-
haviorism.
In the extension of scientific treatment to the
new fields v/hich the earlier Fev;tonian mechanics
had been unable to handle satisfactorily, the con-
cepts of science v^.^ere naturally enlarge^, and its
methods g-enerallzed into a complex set of proce-
dures and standards . ^"^^
The new categories -re regarded as important instruments
for the extension of the scientific method to every reslm
knov.-n to man.
3y making serious use of the category of quality,
, , , contemporary nature lis m has freed itself
from the objection leveled against earlier natu-
ralism, that it excluded from existence, or v/as
committed to neglecting in one way or another, any
qualities experienced or iracginable, including
17^. Randall, art. C 19^4^
175. Ibid.

those in v/hich men delierht ae appects of the high-
est achievements of the srts, the sciences, and
what Aristotle called the master-art of politics.
Contemporary^ naturalists believe, according to Dennes, that
the new categorical terms permit an empirical interpreta-
tion "of concepts, hypotheses, laws, and evaluations de-
veloped in the natural sciences, in historical studies,
and in aesthetic and. moral judgments, "l'^'^
In connection v.nth the attempt et the universal appli-
cation of their netl- od , tliece naturalists express a deep
regard for the function of reason. They wish it understood
that the devotion of naturalists to scientific meth-
od does not include any hostility to rational think-
inp'--as v/as assumed recently bv a rather naive su-
pernaturalist who entitled one of his chapters "The
Encroachment of Scientific ''^ethod on Thought. "-'-'°
Professor TTagel, in bis essay "Logic without Ontology,
discusses the "lav/s of thought" underlining logic and mathe-
matics from the point of view of language as "the instru-
ment for expressing the structures of things and processes,
v/ith "empirically minded naturalistr , " he is "convinced
that matters of fact must be supported by sensory observe-
tion," ^ Krikorian's analysis of mind as organism and
176, Dennes, art, (19^^),
177, Ibid.
178, Randall, art. (19^-^),
179, Nap-el, art, (19^^).

behfvior has alre?ay been touched upon and vvdll receive
further consideration in Chapter IV. Dewej^ says that
the mental functions and moral processes are reducible to
"terms and categories of the na tural sciences, "l^l r^e-
garding reason, he has this to say:
Ancient science accepted the materiel of sense ma-
terial on its face, and then organized it as it
naturally and originally stood, by operations of
logical definition, classification into species,
and syllogistic subsumjjtion, . , , The striking
difference in modern science is, of course, the de-
pendence pieced upon doing, doing of a physical and
overt sort. Ancient science, that is, what passed
as science, would have thought it a kind of treason
to reason, as the organ of knov/ing, to subordinate
it to bodily activity on material thinc-s, helped
out v/ith tools wlich are also material, -^^^
Reason, generally looked upon as the unique and highest
faculty of man, "within the naturalistic fra Tiev.'ork" becomes
subservient to sense experience.
It has been shovm that the differences betv/een tradi-
tional materialism and recent naturalism are identifiable
v^rith the scientists' rejection of the atomic theoi*y and the
substitution of the tteory of creative evolution. This
change in the conception of the ultimate constituents of
nature entailed a shift in naturalism from the basic cate-
gories of matter, motion, and energy to events, qualities,
IRQ. Krikorian, --rt. (19^^^)
.
ISl, Dewev, art, (19^0),
182, ^;ewey, ^:C, B8-S9.
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and. relations. Naturalists believe that their new cate-
gories render their method more flexible; hence, they in-
sist that the scientific method be extended without res-
ervation to every knovm realm, including those—such as
mind and value—from which hitherto it had often been re-
garded as excluded. Every existent is an event within an
all-inclusive physical nature. The intellect has been sub-
ordinated to sensible experience,
ii. Points of Identity
(1) Reliance on Scientific T'^ethod, Reliance solely
upon the findings of the scientific method is not at all a
distinctive mark of recent naturalism. On the contrary, it
has been the ruling element of all materialism and natu-
ralism, Sidney Hook puts it thus
:
\That unites all naturalists , , , from Democritus
to "Oewej/- , . , is the wholehearted acceptance of
scientific method as the only reliable way of
peaching truths about the world of nature, socie-
ty, and man,-^^*^
The scientific method led 'Democritus, in the fourth century
B.C., to the first systematic exposition of atomistic mate-
rialism, which included denial of the soul save as composed
183, Hook, art, (194^),
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of fine, smooth, fiery atoms. Recent naturalists hold the
same essential conclusions, including the denial of the soui
or mind save as a manifestation of the biological orgenism.
The scientific method, limited to sensory data, cannot go
beyond material objects, and this initial methodological re-
striction predetermines a materialistic metaphysics,
(2) Primacy of Matter . Matter is that which is opposed
to the conscious, the spiritual, and the mental; it is
characterized as occupying space, '^'^^ In Runes, the term is
defined as "the physical or noninental, ""^^'^^ and in Webster,
as "that of which any physical object is composed , , • dis-
tinguished from incorporeal substance. "^^'^^
Recent naturalists, like all materialists, believe that
unconscious matter is the basal reality. This is the central
idea conveyed by the definitions of naturalism; the new
categories refer to sensoi*y objects;-^^^ Ed el, for example,
stresses "appreciation of the primacy of matter'"' as funda-
mental in naturalistic philosophy. '^^ TTow, as in the days
of Democritus, matter remains matter, whether it be analyzed
183a, Supra , 60; also, Brightrnan, W, 91.
183b. Keeton, art, (1942); Srightman, ITP, 388,
183c, Keeton, ibid,
183d, Neilson (ed.), V/ITID, s.v, "matter,"
184, Dennes, art, (1944),
185. Ed el, art, (1944).
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as compo£e(? of atoms, or as an aggregate of centers of
energy. Both traditional materialism and recent natural-
ism believe that all the realities of the universe are but
manifestations of matter, anri, correlatively, both deny
all supracensible existence. In these essential tenets,
the vievv^E are identical,
(3) Self-sufficiency of I'lature . In previous discus-
sion of the definitions of r.aturaliS-Ti , it v;as pointed, out
that recent na LuralifTx.F regsrr^ nauure as a selr-sui'i iciar.t
process, reauiring no supernatural or i-rrnscenoental expla-
nation. Trsditional m&terialis cs, too, vievved nature as
seiT-suiricient snct j^eli-explana toiy in terms of the blind
motions of atoms in space.
It thus appears that, intrinsically, recent naturalism
and traditional materialism are identical. Both accept the
scientific method as the sole approach to truth; consequent-
ly, both believe that matter and its laws constitute the ul-
timate reality, and both repudiate the supernatural and su-
persensible. The differences, however, are important, and
mark clearly the significant movement from materialism
toward idealism in naturalistic thought. This trend toward
idealism is the matter of discussion in the following chap-
ter. Briefly, the idealistic tendencies reside in the de-
parture from the strictly analytic method of materialism;
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in the adoption of the ide-?listic goal of holism, of the
idealistic view of being as activity, and in the concept
of mind as a unioue entity: and in the liberal attitude
toward the objectivity of value.

d9
CHAPTER IV
MTURALTSTTC TRSATJffiNT OF IDEALISTIC VIEWS
1. Naturalistic Treatment of the Synoptic Method of Idealism
i. Definition of the Synoptic Method
According to Webster, method , derived from two Greek
forms meaning" "way after," is the piarsuit of something; and
synoptic , also from two Greeks forms meaning "view together,"
is defined as "affording a view of the whole. "^ The synop-
tic method is the method which seeks an understanding of
the universe as a v/hole.
Since Plato taught that true knov/ledge reouired that
the special sciences no longer remain separate units but
that they "be brought together in a synopsis , " philosophers
down the ages have pursued the ideal of a synoptic compre-
hension of the universe. The great geniuses have sought the
way to a holistic explanation which would satisfy the crav-
ing of the human mind for a unitary concept \imder which to
subsume the multiplicity known to experience.
Philosophy is the science of sciences, not in the sense
of an aggregate of the sciences, but rather in the sense of
the general science which aims at complete truth. Its goal
1. Neilson (ed.), 'WID^ s.v. "method;" "synoptic."
2, Plato, Re2'> 537C.
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is a comprehensive, integrated explanation of the univer-
sal order in its first causes and reasons, by the estab-
lishment of the interrelationship of all of experience and
of all points of view. For this purpose, the idealistic
philosopher believes that the best method thus far devised
is the sjmoptic method of idealism.
The synoptic method is the method appropriate to phi-
losophy, for, as philosophy includes all the sciences, the
synoptic method includes all other philosophical methods
and surpasses them. It welcomes and respects the achieve-
ments of all other methods, but it seeks a deeper and broad-
er meaning than that found in the separate facts of obser-
vation, analysis, deduction, and overt verification. The
synoptic method utilizes all facts, "views them together,"
end considers the dualities of the whole, realizing that
wholes possess properties often absent in their parts. 3 The
synoptic method is the onljr method which takes into account
all available information, and applies the light of reason
toward the most coherent explanation of the universe end
man. It leads to faith in an Intelligent First Cause.
ii. The Analytic Method of Traditional J.feterialism
A characteristic feature of the scientific method.
3. Brightman, ITP, 22-29,
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which hap been the method of all materialiem, is the pro-
cedure of analysis. Analysis, a term derived from two Greek
words meaning "loose up," is defined as the "separation of
anything into its constituent parts or elements,"^ This def-
inition is also a description of the analytic method which
holds that truth is reached through the complete analysis
of the ob.iects of perception. The analytic method dissects
wholes into parts, observes the parts and their relations,
and accumulates facts about them.^ It classifies rather
than advances knowledge. The various sciences, through ob-
servation and analysis, accumulate blocks of valuable but
isolated data, but their method checks the soaring of the
mind to a coherent unified explanation possible of achieve-
ment only through synopsis.
The analytic method is an inadequate instrument for
the formulation of concltisions about the nature of the uni-
verse, because it cannot get beyond observed or observable
data. Hence, it ignores the undeniable experience of the
immediate consciousness. Furtherm-ore, it loses sight of
the fact that the Qualities of wholes are often lost to
their parts, and reconstructs the universe from the shreds
4. Neilson (ed.), TOD, s.v. "analysis,"
6. Brightman, ITP, 22-27; 110-112.

102
of analysis: the universe of Democritus was composed of
atoms; the imiverv'^e of the modern naturalists consists in
events. The analytic method stops short where the synop-
tic method begins.
iii. Traces of the Synoptic Method in the Scientific
Method of Recent Naturalism
The scientific method of recent naturalism, while es-
sentially analytic, nevertheless bears indications of a
trend tov/ard the synoptic method of idealism.
Some of these indications have received attention in
connection with other aspects of this discussion. It has
been pointed out that these naturalists believe that the
new categories implement t>.eir method for the adequate in-
vestigation of such realms as aesthetic and moral Judg-
ments: their method, they feel, is no longer restricted to
the analysis of bodies obviously extended in space. ^ Also,
the naturalists emphasize their regard for the "laws of
thought" and rational thinking in general. This marked rec-
ognition of the mental functions, even though these are ex-
plained in materialistic terms, seems a definite advance
beyond the strictly analytic method of the traditional ma-
terialists.
6. Hook, art. (1944): Dennes, art. (1944).
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It is particularly in the naturalistic sj^'stem of Roy
Wood Sellars that idealistic tendencies seem most easily
discernible. It is not that he is in any sense an ideal-
ist, but, while adhering to naturalism, he lays far more
stress than do most naturalists upon certain idealistic
principles.
Sellars looks upon the analytic method as preeminent-
ly the method of philosophy, but he does not identify phi-
losophy and scientific method. He esteems "science and its
methods," but science is not the sole arbiter; its function
is "doing more of the experimenting and of detailed obser-
vation; "^ Science is unable "to explain its own existence
and nature;" and some of its basic assumptions, such as the
potentiality of the human mind for knowledge, are justifi-
able only by philosophy,^ The specialized sciences provide
data for philosophy, but "philosophy, itself, is a persis-
tent reflection upon these facts and croncepts developed by
the sciences; "^0 it is not"something superimposed upon sci-
ence so much as something which science culminates in, "^"^
This statement, albeit marked by extreme caution, barely
misses a full expression of the idealistic conception of
7, Sellars, art. (19^4).
8, Sellars, PPP, 6.
9, Sellars, PPR, 45-^6.
10. Sellars, PPP, 7.
11. Sellars, ibid., 179-180,
t<1'' 'i'^^" J""
^ r •-• ^
-J
f '
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of philosophy as the s;\mthesizer of. all knowledge.
Sellars is explicit regarding his view of synopsis as
a necessary charactei'istic of the proper method of philos-
ophy. The province of philosophy, he says, is to study the
results of all the sciences and to "seek coherence in their
synthesis," for the "philosopher is a synthesist by profes-
sion,"^^ "For me," he says, "the task of the philosopher
is to analyze concepts and principles and to perform a la-
bor of ETmthesis. "13 A^ain, in greater detail, he asserts:
In short, the method of philosophy is an analytic-
synthe<:ic reflection upon the world as it is spread
out before a mind full of the knowledge gained by
the sciences. It aims to be a penetrative survey
of reality as knov/n. It does not so much have a
source of knov;ledge all its own , , , as a duty to
bring human knowledge to its stage of clarification
and synoptic synthesis.
It would be difficult to find a more accurate expression of
the method of idealism than this from the pen of a natural-
ist. The keynote is reflection; analysis is specified as
a prerecuisite; the accumulated knowledge of the sciences
constitute the data; and the aim is a comprehensive expla-
nation of "reality as knovm,
"
In his esteem for reason, too, Sellars seems to approach
12. Sellars, art. (1927).
13. Sellars, PPP, 17S.
14. Ibid., 181,
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ideelism. He describes himself as "a rationalist and skep-
tical of the self-contradictoriness of reason. "^^ Yet, in
agreement with other recent naturalists, he looks upon mind
as a "physical category, "-^^
Among naturalists in general there appear hints of de-
parture from the strictly analytic methofl of the tradition-
al materialists, and toward the synoptic method of the ide-
alists. The general tendency is apparent in at leatt two
respects. First, the attempted extension of the methods of
science into arees unencorapassed by the strictly analytic
method, indicates a straining toward the flexibility and in
clusiveness of the synoptic method. Secondly, recent natu-
ralists admit vdde uses of reason.
The method of Sellars is especially colored by tenden-
cies toward the method of idealism. First, Sellars is ide-
alistic in his view of philosophy as the science embracing
all other sciences; he doBS not identify philosophy with
the scientific method, as do many naturalists. Secondly,
Sellars viev/s synthesis as necessary to an adequate philo-
sophical method. He seems torn between a recognition of
the superiority of the synoptic method and an allegiance to
the naturalistic method, the balance of power being with
15. Sellars, PPR, 341,
16. Sellars, EW, 300,
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the latter, for his ultimate conclusions are in terms of
"event," an outcome of the analytic method. Finally, Sel-
lars holds reason to be an important factor in philosophi-
cal procedure, although reason in his view is but a mani-
festation of the biological organism.
All in all, the scientific method ot recent naturalism
is still predominantly analytic. Nevertheless, it is no
longer exclusively analytic, and it contains clearly dis-
cernible tendencies toward the synoptic method of idealism.
2. TTaturalistic Treatment of the Holistic Goal of Idealism
i. Idealistic View of the Truth as the ^'vTiole
The idealistic system exemplifies, throughout, the
philosophical ideal of truth as utterly comprehensive and
integrated, at the same time recognizing that, for the fi-
nite mind, it is an ideal unattainable but forever beckon-
ing. Holism is the doctrine that the essential nature is
located in the v/hole rather than in its constituent parts;
it is based on the fact that a part may not be truly known
in isolation, but only as it is completely known in its re-
lations to the whole. Holism has characterized all sound
philosophy. The concept is well epitomized in Hegel's
,01=: if
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Words: "The truth is the whole,
The holistic attitude is persistently and unfailingly
a ruling principle of idealism. It governs the aim, the
d8t5, the method, and the conclusions. The aim is holistic
in that it seeks a profound and comprehensive knowledge of
all of reality and of its ultimate cause and purpose. The
data are holistic, for they comprise all the experiences of
men, both, mediate and immediate, including a knowledge of
all +he details discovered by all the sciences, which, in
a sense, perform the groundwork of philosophy. The method
is holistic in its utilization of every known road to truth.
In presupposing all scientific achievem.ents, the method of
idealism includes the analytic method and also all the in-
struments of verification known to the sciences. This is
the starting point of synthesis. Then, reason is applied
to the consideration of all the facts in all their rela-
tionships. Judgments are sifted by the coherence criterion
which demands inclusiveness and consistency. The conclu-
sion is necessarily holistic, for nothing known is omitted
in the process of forming it. The ultimate explanation is
found in the goodness of God, the Intelligent First Cause,
who is the Creator of the whole universe.
17. Hegel, POM, I, II, 16.
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ii. Truncated View of Materialism
Materialism evinces the holistic attituc!e in only one
respect, in its aim to explain the v\*iole of reality. There
the holistic attitude ends, and the truncated attitude be-
comes the controlling agent of the data, the method, and
the conclusions. At the outset, by identifying philosophy
with the natural sciences, materialism nullifies the possi-
bility of a holistic conclusion. Philosophy, the data of
which include all the sciences, is identified with a part
of its data. Thereby, materialism engages in the obyious
fallacy of identifying a v^hole v/ith one of its parts and
then explaining the whole in terms of the part.
The major premise of materialism is the belief that
all knov/ledge derives from the scientific method. By this
premise, materialism limits its data to the objects of sen-
sory perception, thereby mutilating facts of human experi-
ence which are vividly and immediately perceived by the con-
sciousness. The mutilation consists in ignoring, or deny-
ing, or arbitrarily explaining in terms of physicalism, such
experiences as m.ind or will immediately recognized as unique.
The method is truncated in its limitation to the single
procedure of analysis. It disregards, synthesis and di£«
parages reason. Validity is found solely in what is
i
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publicly verifiable, and ultira? te reality is in the small-
est particle founc! by analysis carried to the uttermost.
Analysis is one part of the s^vnoptic method, the most
comprehensive method knovm. T^aterialivSm regards the par-
tial method as more reliable that the holistic method
which embraces and surpasses the partial. !\,feterialism,
m.anipulating selected data by means of a partial method,
establishes at the outset the conclusion that the ultimate
explanation is in the tiniest part that science can find.
iii. Holistic Tendencies in Recent Naturalism
It has been pointed out that recent naturalists haye
broadened their conception of scientific method beyond the
traditional narrow interpretation which regarded it as ex-
clusively analytic. This trend in the direction of a holis-
tic method is accompanied by other holistic tendencies, A
holistic conception is suggested in the naturalistic defi-
nition of nature as all-inclusive, especially in view of
the emphasis upon nature as the v>^hole of reality specifi-
cally including man in all his aspects, mental and moral as
well as phjrsical, and also in all his activities, not omit-
ting his moral and aesthetic judgments. This concept of
man as continuous with all of nature is regarded by natu-
ralists as a notable advance beyond the traditional view,
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and toward a unified--or holistic—explanation. In the
traditional view,
a purely mechanical system
. , , left man— or at
least the essential paj?t of his being, his 'mind'
. . . in a world stripped of all intelligible struc-
ture. Between man, his 'mind' and experience on
the one hand, and Fature on the other, there yawned
a chasm,
. , . Human life and 'mind' grew Quite un-
intelligible in terms of such a mechanistic science,
Naturalists consider that the "chasm" has been closed. All
things, including man and his mind, are to be interpreted
within a "mild mechanism, "^^ through the process of creative
evolution. At this point in naturalistic thought, there ap-
pears an urge toward holism in the attempt at all-inclu&ive-
ness,and, in conjunction with it, an outspoken recognition
of the Qualitative distinction of "mind" expressed in the
words, "the essential part of his man's being. The ide-
alis^-ic tendency becomes even more definite in the light of
the current scientific and naturalistic conception of mat-
ter, as aspect to feceive further attention in the follow-
ing section.
Inseparably connected v;4th the revised conception of
matter is another well-defined trend in recent naturalism
18. Randall, art, (1944).
19, Krikorian, art, (19^4),
1r
4---t
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toward idealistic holism. It stems from the recent shift in
naturalism from the traditional categories of matter, mo-
tion, and energy to the new basic categTories of events,
Qualities, and relations.
The shift in categories is significant. Naturalists
and idealists agree that in the selected categories inhere
far-reaching philosophical determinations. It seems unde-
niable that the ba^sic categories decide the ultimate con-
clusions, as both Brightman and Dennes assert. Dennes puts
it thus:
How, then are philosophical positions (such as those
called naturalistic, idealistic, end so forth) dis-
tinguished from one another?
. . .
Many gifted phi-
losophers h8ve lately converged upon one sort of
swer to these Questions. They have argued that phi-
losophic positions are distinguished essentially by
the different basic categories which they employ in
interpretation, and by conseouent differences in the
interpretations which they develop. An examination
of ^:he relations that hold between the basic cate-
gories employed in explanatory statements and the
content of these statements is therefore important
f or the understanding, not only of naturalistic phi-
losophy, but of any philosophy, ^0
Similarly, Brightman says that the nature of any philosophy,
whether it be materialistic, agnostic, idealistic, realistic,
theistic, or atheistic derives from its doctrine of the cate-
gories. 21 The categories themselves, it must be remembered,
20. Dennes, art. (1944).
21. Brightman, ITP, 96.
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are determined by the area and content of experience that
the philosopher deems significant.
Recent naturalists are keenly aware of the importance
of their shift to the basic category of event. As already
noted in Chapter III, they believe that the category of
event brings within the scope of a naturalistic explanation
unlimited areas, such as mind and value, formerly closed to
it; and this "extension" of method tends to holism. Also,
holism is manifested in the naturalistic interpretation of
events as the ultimate constituents of the whole universe,
"of all that exists," The world consists in "events and
their qualities and relations;" there exists nothing except
"events , . , and further stretches of events. . , , Every
range of events is
. . . embedded in contexts of such fur-
ther events;" and an event is "anything v;hich happens. "^^
A universe consisting of things "which happen" seems closer
to the to the idealistic conception of the universe as the
expression of God's will, than does a universe explained
in terms of rigid atomism and mechanism.^^^
Sellars* system, too, reveals holistic tendencies. Ma-
ture, he says, is all-inclusive and "identical with existence
22, Dennes, art.(19<4).
22a, The naturalist's category of "event" is a manifes-
tation of energy, and the idealist's universe is
the energizing of God's will. See infra , 89 and
117,

8T\d reality," and "man is a part of the fabric of the
worlif." Mind is a physical category, and consciousness
is "but a feature of a physical event. "^"^
From this discussion, it appears that recent natural-
istic thought is characterized by a.n urge toward a more
holistic view than that of traditional materialism. Natu-
ralists ai-e holistic in their attempt to account for the
whole universe, inclusive of the whole man with all his ex-
perience. The attempted explanation seems less far-fetched
v;hen couched in terms of the new category of "event" which
has displaced the outmoded theory of discrete atoms. How-
ever, the approach to the idealistic view ende in the natu-
ralistic doctrine of the primacy of matter, and the desig-
nation of the categories as "sets of occurences" in sen-
sory objects.^^
3, Naturalistic Treatment of the Idealistic View of Being
as Activity
i. Idealistic View of Being as Activity
All idealism holds the view that mind is the ultimate
23. Sellars, art. (193^).
24. Sellars, PFR, ^2a,
25. Dennes, art. (19^).
I.3 ' •trf J r
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realit3^ in the universe. Theistic idealiwsm interprets re-
ality as the functioning of the Divine V'/ill. All physical
things exist in the thought and will of God "so that they
are nothing apart from Kim. . . . Their matter and energy
is his conscious purpose concretely expressed',' Finite per-
sons are also the expression of the Divine Will, but their
being differs from that of physical things in that they are
"not identical with his consciousness, as is the being of
physical things," For finite persons, God wills an indepen-
dent existence "genuinely other than Himself; , . . their
being is self-conscious and relatively self-determining,
"
Theistic idealism regards the universe as a society of
selves all deriving their existence from the activity or
functioning of the thought and v.dll of God, in v/hom resides
the ultimate unity.
For the tlieistic idealist, nature has only phenomenal
existence, but not in the sense of illusion.
There is universal agreement among both scientists
and philosopherv^. that a large part of the sense-world
has only phenomenal existence,
. . , But the phenom.e-
nal world remains real in its way. It forms the con-
tents of our objective experience, and is the field
in which we all meet in mutual understanding. It ex-
presses, then, a common element to all, and is no
26. Brightman, ITP, 246-247,
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private fiction of the individual. Concerning it
the proper ouev<5tion is not, Is it real? but rather,
^/hat kind of reality does it have?'^^^
The same author answers the question in the words: "Thought
is rapidly reducing the world to phenomenal existence, and
making it the manifestation of an energy not its own.,"^^
The world
is not compounded of atoms and their forces, but
is rather a product of one infinite, omnipresent,
eternal energy by which it is continually sup-
ported, and from vrhich it incessantly proceeds,
The world depends upon God.'^O ^he first and highest prin-
ciple of all things is God, the one perfect spiritual Being.
Theistic idealism maintains the distinctness of God and the
world, yet binds them together in unity, for all existence
is the activity, or energizing, of the Divine Mind,
ii. Materialistic View of Being as Mechanistic Atomism
Traditional materialism is the viev.^ that the ultimate
explanation of the universe is found in matter conceived as
an aggregate of atoms in motion. The mind is explained as
the complex motion of the atoms which form the brain. Atoms,
according to earlier science, were minute, indivisible,
27. Bowne, I'ET, 8,9.
28. Ibid., 64.
29. Ibid,, 2^3/
30. Ibid., 119
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discrete, pranular particles constantly in motion.
On the basis of the lav/s of physics, materialism holds
that this completely physical universe is self-sufficient
and self-explanatory. The progress of the universe, with
all its changes, is due to the mechanical relations of at-
oms in motion. The universe is a mechanism of indestruct-
ible tiny particles, and the present is determined and ex-
plained as the necessary/- result of their past relations. 31
The world is "a purely mechanical system of tiny billiard-
balls. ""^^ Materialism offers no explanation rendering com-
prehensible their claim th&t hard impersonal atoms, of them-
selves, move in such a way as to produce the complexity,
design, orr'er, and grandeur apparent even to the finite mind.
iii. Naturalistic Vievj- of Being as Activity;-
Modern science has rendered untenable the traditional
materialistic explanation in terms of mechanistic atomism.
The atom is now understood, not as a hard indestructible
particle, but as organized centers of energy/" not unlike elec-
tricity.^3 TT[^e recent naturalist, respecting the conclu-
sions of natural science, is "cuite aware that 'matter' has
in modern science none of the lov/, base, inert properties"
31. Brightman, T^^P, 251, 259,
32. Randall, art. (1944).
33. Bris-htraan, I^^P, 108-109,
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formerly assigned to it.*^^ He has discarded " the earlier
yewtonian mechanics which had been unable to handle satis-
factorily , , . the new fields" opened by the "enlarged
36
. , , concepts of science," He now looks upon the atom
as composed of active energy and the universe as a "store-
house of electric energy,"
In applying to the new basic category the distinctive
designation event, . the sole specific attribute of which is
process . naturalists convey the conception that the ul-
timately real is activity. Event is derived from the -i^atin
term evtoire . meaning to come out , and is defined as "that
36b
which comes, aj?rives, or happens." In etymology and by
definition, event involves action. Process is derived from
the La.tin word procedere, which means to move forward , and
id defined as "the act of proceeding ... a series of ac-
tions, motions, or operations , , , continued forward move-
ment," The central meaning of process , like that of
event, is action or motion. TTaturalists have thus adopted
the traditional idealistic view that reality is activity,
but they still emphatically repudiate the idealistic
34, Dewey, art. (1944),
35, Randall, art. (1944).
36, Brightman, ITP, 109.
36a, Supra
. 89.
36b. Feilson (ed. ), 'mD, s.v. "event."
36c, Ibid
. ,
s,v, "process,"
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hypothesis that Mind is the source and explanation of every-
thing, They have supplanted the theory of mechanistic
atomism with the belief that all existence is comprised in
a self-explanatory, dynamic physical universe. '^^^
Sellars, in relating his philosophical considerations
to the electro-magnetic theory of modern science, holds that
"It is time that the newer conceptions of matter find their
philosophical interpretation," and he calls his system
"the nev; materialivsm" 6r "the new naturalism," Atoms exist,
he says, as the simplest and the most basic entities con-
ceivable and constitute the floor of the universe, Matter,
he asserts, is "active, dynamic, relational and self-organiz-
ing, "^® and "at the very least ... of the stuff of elec-
40tricity, " Regarding Sellers' new materialism, Parker com-
ments: "Each step he has taken in the reformation of materi-
alism is a step nearer spiritualism- -one more and he will be
there. ""^^
Dev^ey, too, points the distinction between his own posi-
tion end nineteenth-century mechanistic materialism. Such
materialism, Sftys Dewey, is contrary to fact:
36d. Infra. 124.
36e. Supra
. 116.
37. Sellars, PPR, 232.
38. Sellers, art. (1943).
39. Sellars, art. (1944).
40. Sellars, PPE, 321.
41. Parker, art. (1944),
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FiPtoricallv ppeakinp, materialism and mechaniw^^tic
metaphvFicf;--aF distinct from mechanistic science--
aesiPTiete the doctrine that matter is the efficient
cause of life and mind, and that 'cause' occupies
^
a position superior in reality to that of 'effect.^^
Both parts of this statement are contrary to fact.
The IMewtonian philosophy of nature, according to which "dead
matter moved under impulse of insensate forces," Dewey says,
is "now discredited. '"^-2 Nature is not a mechanism in the
older sense of mathematical predetermination, but "something
problematic, undecided, still going-on and as yet unfinished
and indeterminate. "^^^
The vjholehearted acceptance by recent naturalists of
the theory of evolution represents another advance beyond
traditional materialism. Naturalists look u-on the publi-
cation of the Origin of Species as "the most important si
single event in the history of modern naturalism, ""^^ and
so profound is the naturalists' esteem for the theory that
the term naturalism has sometimes been identified with
evolution. Naturalists seem to interpret the theory as
en irrefutable apology for their belief that man in all his
aspects is within an all-inclusive nature,, It is said that
the evolution controversy
. . .
had the effect of
42. Dewey, EAN, 262,
43, Dewey, QFC, 110,
4^. Dewey, KAN, 3^8.
^5
. Larrabee , art
.
( 19^^ )
.
^6. Ibid.
4
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completely demoliphing the prestige of idealism,
thereby clearing the field for its relatively un-
damaffed opponent. It became evident that man's
privileged position in the cosmos and all the de-
fensive idealisms which had sought to bolster it
must nov/ be abandoned. Henceforth, all inquiries
and debates must be carried on in new terras and in
a nev/ setting: as themselves developing activities
of growing human organisms mutually adapting and
adjusting themselves to their changing and physi-
cal and cultural environments. '^'^
As evolutionists, recent naturalists attribute man's estate
to activity developed within organisms, of themselves. The
clue to evolution is self-developed activity, or energy/-.
The naturalistic stress upon an internal self-develop-
ment is akin to the dialectical process in the Hegelian sys-
tem of absolute idealism, Hegel taught that "the truth is
the v^hole,"^^ and that reality is "self-becoming, self-de-
velopment.""^^ The self-development consists in a dialecti-
cal process in which Spirit, conceived as the higher ra-
tional and spiritual principle, is forever seeking fuller
realization, and is forever striving toward Freedom, which
is the fullest possible realization of man's highest capa-
cities.^^ The Spirit which is the dvnamic force of the. pro-
cess, is called the Absolute, the all-inclusive unity,
47. R?ndall, art. (19^^).
48. Hegel, POM, I, II, 16.
^9. Ibid., 11, 16.
50. Ibi_d., II, II, 34, 35.
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embracing not only the causal energ^r^ but also, in a sense,
the goFl, which is the expression of His inexhaustibly rich
potentialities.^-^
The naturalistic conception of the universe suggests
the Hegelian conception in several important respects. Both
regard reality as an all-inclusive whole; both conceive the
universe as a self-developing system; for both, the devel-
opment derives from activity. The cleavage between the two
systems, as between all naturalism and all idealism, is in
their respective views regarding the source of the activity;
Hegel places the source of all energy in the Absolute Spirit;
naturalism places it in matter, albeit matter conceived as
singularly endowed with remarkable attributes.
There is another striking advance toward idealism, also
inspired in recent naturalism by modern scientific progress.
It has been pointed out that the conception of matter as en-
ergy brought about the recent naturalistic shift to the cate-
gory of event, which, while eluding exact definition, nev-
ertheless is taken to mean "anything which happens." r^ery-
thing, for recent naturalism, consists in events; there is
nothing but events, end "further stretches of events:" end
51. Kegel, POM, II, II, 101.
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categories are referred to as "sets of occurrences. Some
remarkably similar statements have been made by a theistic
idealist. Bovme asserts:
There is no substantial nature, but only natural
events; and a natural event is one v/hich occurs in
an orr'er of lavr, or one which v;e can connect with
other events according to rule.^'^
The naturalists and the idealist, Bovme, conceive nature as
a procev'^s, as a series of events or occurrencer^- . In view
of the ultimate metaphysical conclusions inherent in the
basic categories selected, the naturalistic category of
event suggew=^ts the possibility of an unlimited approach to
idealism.
The discussion in this section has centered upon
the conception of beincr eg activity, Theistic idealism be-
lieves thrt the universe is the creation of the activity of
the Mind and 'Vill of God. Traditional materialism views
all existence as brought about by the constant motion of
an aggregate of tiny, discrete, indestructible, "billiard-
ball" atoms, the initial cause of the motion, however, be-
ing unexplained and incomprehensible. Recent naturalism,
in line with modern science, is at one v*,dth idealism in
52. Denne.<^, art. (19^-^).
63. Bovme, ^TIT, 259.
54. Brightman, TTP, 96,
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regarc'inp being; as activity. 'Hie naturalistic conception
of beincr as activity is manifest in at least four signifi-
cant respects: (1) "Hie all-inclusive nature of naturalism
consists through and throup-h of atoms composed of centers
of active energ^r, or activity'-. (2) l^Taturalists believe, in
accordance with the evolution theory which they wholeheart-
edly^ accept, that man's status arises from self-developed
activities v/ithin the organism. (3) The self-developing
universe of naturalism bears a resemblance to Hegel's ide-
alistic conception of a "self'-becoming, self-developing"
Whole. (^) The naturalistic category of event parallels,
in a measure, Bowne's view of a nonsubstantial nature com-
posed only of events. Fence, naturalists and idealists agree
that bein^ is activity'". But there the agreement ends.
The divergence otjcurs regarding the source of the ac-
tivity, i^'aturalists believe the activity to be somehow in-
herent in matter itself. Idealists believe the initial ac-
tivity to be in food's Mind. Idealists find this conclu-
sion inescapable because their synoptic method demands con-
sideration of all of experience, and they are therefore boiond
to take into account the immediately experienced fact that
overt action is e.lweys preceded by an act of mind. Natu-
ralists, on the other hand, restricted by their method,
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are bouncl, at the risk of self-contradiction, to fashion
their explanation of ultimates within the current facts
of science.
4. Naturalistic Treatment of the Idealistic Viev; of T-^ind
as Basic to F.eality
i, Realitjr of Ilind in Idealism
A fundamental and characteristic principle of all ide-
alism is the belief that the basic reality is of the nature
of mind, Bowne sa^'-s that mind is the "only ontological re-
ality." Ke continues:
Intellip-ence is and acts, "H-iis is the deepest
fact. It is not subject to any lav7S beyond it-
self, nor to any abstract principle v/ithin it-
self, Livinr, acting intelligence is the source
of all truth and reality, and is its ov.ti and on-
ly stanc'ard,^^
God is the sole and. independent Cause of the universe. Per-
sons, as well as physical things, are the expression of the
Mind of the vSupreme Person, upon whom alone depends all ex-
istence,^*^
Physical things, as revealed to the finite mind, suggest
55. Bovme, t^'^'^, ^25.
5^. Ibid
, ,
101.
n
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that they were created by the activity of Mind, "The sj'-s-
tem of things is active like a mnd; changes, like a mind;
is coherent and rational, like a mind; and vdthin limits
mind can use it.'"- Perceived entities seem to be "cast in
the molds of thought," for they are continuously more clear-
ly understood by the finite mind, Plence, the idealist finds
it more reasonable to believe that they are the energizing
of Hind,
Idealism, seeking the most coherent explanation of" ell
experience by means of the sjmoptic method, is not satis-
fied vdth the infinite regress and tautology of mechanism;
the more acceptable hypothesis, in this viev/, is the belief
that the only sufficient cause is an Intelligent First Cause,
which is the activity of the Mind of God.
ii. Denial of Mine in Traditional Materialism
Materialism is the view that reality'' is nonmental, and
that the ultimate explanation is to be found in matter and
its lav/s. All materialism, patterned upon D-^ocritean atom-
ism, has modeled its universe upon the physical and has de-
nied to mind any existence apart from matter. Democritus
taught that the mind or soul is a complex of fine, smooth,
57. Erightman, ITP, 122.
58. Bowne, TTK, 296.
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fiery atoms, penetrating the whole body end imperting life.
Most later materialists have refrarded mind as the rerultant
of the complex motion of innumerable very fine atoms compos-
ing the brain.
T'lechanistic atom.ism offers no intelligible explanation
of the immediately experienced facts of consciousness. Vo-
lition, thought, hope, choice, or purpose are vividly known
to self-experience, but there is nothing analogous to them
in matter.^^ The materialistic denial of soul or mind as an
incorporeal entit^r is incoherent when all the facts of expe-
rience are taken into consideration,
iii. Vievx of Mind in Recent Faturalism
The naturalistic concept of mind represents an advance
beyond the materialistic view, but it falls far short of the
idealistic conclusion that reality is of the nature of mind.
The discussion in Chapter III of this work pointed out
that the rejection of mind, in the traditional and idealis-
tic sense, is an integral part of the naturalistic philoso-
phy, end that naturalists are prone to dwell persistently
and repeatedly upon their denial of mind.
The viev/ of mind in any philosophical system is vital
59. Erightm.an, ITP, 231-23^.
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for the interpretRtion of ninrl determines many critical
philosophical problems, ")ewey puts it thus:
The philosophic implications embedded in the very
heart of psycholofry are not got rid of when they
are kept out of sight. Some opinion regarding
the nature of mind and its relations to reality
will show itself on almost every page, and the
fact that this opinion is introduced without con-
sciou.s intention of the writer may serve to con-
fuse both the author and his reader. 60
Dewey denies the traditional "soul" or "mind" which
is the mental principle understood as an existence distinct
from the body and having personal individuality and iden-
tity. Such a "soul" or "mind" he looks upon as merely a
"superstitious encumbrance."^-^ Fe believes that
Thinking is mental, not because of a peculiar stuff
which enters into it or of peculiar non-natural ac-
tivities which constitute it, but because of what
physical acts and appliances do: the distinctive
purpose for which they are employed.
Influenced by Darwinian evolution, Dev^ey regards both mind
and body as organs evolved from lower forms in the struggle
for existence. He v/rites that "the brain is primarily an
organ of a certain kind of behavior, not of knowing the
world. '^''^ He repudiates all attempts to assign mind and bod^''
(nO, Dev.'-ey, Ps'^'^ch
. , iv,
61. Dewey, EAF, 29^.
62. Dewey. KRL, 14
.
63. Dewey, CF, 36.
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to different existential realme/'^'^ He asserts:
A naturalistic metaphysic is bound to consider re-
flection as a natural event occurring witMn na-
ture because of the traits of the latter .'^^
Regarding this salient aspect of Dewey's thought, Max
Carl Otto, in ^in?s and Ideals , is particular 137 articulate:
We are coning to see, thanks especially/- to John
Dewey, that the self is the integration—literal-
ly not figuratively- -of organism and environment.
As water is the novel result of the combination
of two gases, ... so the self is the active e-
malgamation of inborn potentialities and environ-
mental forces, physical and social.
. , ,
vVe might
say that the environment forms habits when it gets
organisms to form them with, instead of saying, as
we now do, that organisms form habits when they
get an environment to form them with.^^
This is a pregnant passage. At the outset. Otto places
himself unreservedly in accord with Dewey, and he leaves no
doubt that he wishes to be understood literally. Me affirms
Dewey's viev; of the mind or self as something acquired,
something developed hy interaction with environment, re-
^iectirg v/hat Dev^ey rep-ards as the basic dualism of all du-
alisms, namely, that which isolates "mind from activity in-
volving physical conditions, bodily organs, material ap-
pliances, and natural objects, "^'^ V/ith Dewey and the
6^, Dewey, EA]^% 28^.
65, Ibid,, 68.
66, Otto, TAI, 151-152.
67, Dewey, DAE, 377,
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and the evolutionists and traditional materi? lists, he holds
that the active principle is in the environment,
Krikorian's essay, "A Naturalistic Viev; of Tfind," is
an apolopy for and exposition of behaviorism. He takes is-
sue vdth Professor Hocking's position that "the nature of
mind eludes scientific, experimental psychology," and that
natural science can deal only with a "Fear-mind." Because,
for Krikorian, "nature is the whole of reality" and is what
"empirical science finds it to be,'' the "facts of mind"
constitute no "cul-de-sac" for naturalism. He v/rites:
The belief that nature is the whole of reality im-
plies that mind should be examined as a natural
phenomenon among other natural phenomena. It has
its origin, growth, and decay within the physical,
biolop^icFl and social setting.
Krikorian insists that mind is to be investigated
through analysis by "objective meth-^ds." He asserts that
"mind must be analyzed as behavior, since behavior is the
only aspect of mind which is open to experimental examina-
tion." ¥.±nd is "a specific type of behavior" v/hich derives
from life, and life depends "on a complex physico-chemical
organization" and vanishes "with the disintegration of
this," Following a minute analjrsis of observable behavior.
68. Krikorian, art. (194^),
•I 1
Krikorian conclucle£:
The different dimensions of mind--th8t is, mind
as copnition, as conation, and as consciousness
. .
."form a unity. And this unity is the whole
-
nc
" - ^ ^-^--^v-
tr\
... ........... .... ,
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is the integrated action. '"^^
This is behaviorism, and, in the light of referral to the
"biological organism," it is a denial of consciousness;
hence it is metaphors ice 1 behaviorism or a "form of materi-
alism."'^^
In this connection, it is easily understood that natu-
ralists should hail the publication of Charles Darwin's
Origin of Species as "the most important single event in
the history of modern naturalism in America, "'^1 presenting,
as it did, a seemingly conclusive exposition of the facts
of "man's biological ascent from primordial protoplasm,"
facts which naturalists "do not presume to question. "'^^ Ac-
cording to Fiunes, Darwin "served to establish firmly in all
scientific minds the fact of evolution. "'^^ It is on this
basis that naturalists make statements such as : "The fun-
damental importance of evolutionarjr thought" lies primarily
f>9, Krikorian, art. (19^4),
70. Wood, art. (19^5).
71. Larrabee, art. (19^-^).
72. Ibid
.
73. Dennon, art. (19^5).

in that men is to be regarded as no different from the
"other aspects of the Nature of v/hich he '(is'- taken to be
a part."'^^ Or again:
Scientific v.'orkers in the biological field are
agreed in accepting some form of genetic devel-
opment of all species of plants and animals, man-
kind included. "Hie conclusion puts man definite-
ly and squarely within the natural v/orld.
In adopting the evolutionary point of viev', naturalists
look upon mind and mental functions, like the ph^z-sicsl or-
gans, as the outcome of fpvorrble variations through natu-
ral selection.
Nevertheless, despite all this, there is in recent
naturalism a marked departure from the rigidity of the tra
ditional m.aterialistic denial of mind as a unique being.
Krikorian's "integrated action," even though assigned to
the "biological organism," is progress when compared with
the random clash of atoms. Also, among recent naturalists
there is recognition, to a degree, of the distinctiveness
of mind, intelligence, consciousness, conation, and of ra-
tional, logical, and moral processes, together with an ear
nest attempt to explain them, albeit always "within the
74, Randall, art. (1944).
75. Dewey, art. (19^^).
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framework of naturalism," However, recognition is far re-
moved from denial, and at least suggests the possibility
of fnrfher progress in the same direction.
It is in Sellers' system that the changing naturalis-
tic concept of mind is most clearl^^ defined. Some- of Sel-
lars' assertions regarding mind are idealistic to a star-
tling degree, even though he denies the ontologicel reali-
ty of mind in statements such as: "The physical is but an-
other term for being, "'^^ "That which is physical is reel,
and that which is real is physical, "'^'^ "The mind, as a con-
tinuant is the brain and the brain is in spatial relations
with other physical systems, "'^8
"Vet he rejects behaviorism, denies epiphenoraenalism,
and asserts the uniqueness and creativity of mind. Re-
garding behaviorism, he says
:
If , . . any psychologist comes to me and says
that there is no such thing as consciousness, I
simply reply that he does not knov/ what he is say-
ing. He may be a very good student of animal be-
havior. But behavior is not a premise from which
the denial of consciousness can be deduced.'^-
With reference to epiphenomenalism, he wites: "The old,
deductive mechanical necessitarianism which thought of man
76. Sellars, PFR, 6.
77. Ibid., 13.
7S. Ibid., ^3^.
79. Sellars, 18.
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as a machine and consciousness as a mere psychic illumina-
tion has received a shrewd blow.
Seemingly approaching the idealistic concept of mind,
Sellars says: "Intelligent integrations of the brain need
consciousness to guide them. "^^ He affirms the "creative
power of intelligence, and the unicue status of mind:
"The situation is unicue. Only in consciousness does na-
ture know itself." "Literally it j consciousness! assists
the brain to solve problems. "S"* "The conscious self sits
in the watch-tov'^er of the brain to guide the organism's be-
havior. "^^ In emphasizing the unioueness, the effective
ener,gy, and the creativity of mind, Sellars is in harmony
with idealism.
But Sellers' vTitings abound in counter-statements
which utterly dispel the impression of idealism. He says,
for example, "Ivlan is no more real tha.n a dog: he is simply
different and able to do things that a dog cannot do."^^
"Stars, plants, ants, and human beings are equally real
.
So far as existence is concerned, it is meaningless to
speak of higher and lower. "87 And the following seems to
be a flat denial of mind in the incorporeal sense of the
80. Sellars, WJ^ 276.
81. Sellars, ibid., 313.
82. Ibid
. ,
31^.
83. Ibid., 310.
84. Sellars, art. (1918).
85. Sellars, EIT, 317.
86. Sellars, RCA, 13/
87. Sellars, ^PR, 6.
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idealistic view:
Even the psychologist has become skeptical of
spirits and sonls as agents. They seem to him
round souares, wholes without parts, creative en-
ergies which need no fuel. Animism
. , . has been
giving way to a naturalistic interpretation of
mind which cuts loose from the ghost-soul.
Sellars defines consciousness as "an event" resting
upon "mind-brain" activity/. 89 it "is not an independent e-
vent but a feature of a physical event. "^^ "It is obvious
that we cannot assign efficacy to consciousness by itself,
since it is merely a feature of the cortical event. "^^ "In
short, make consciousness intrinsic to the brain event, and
its efficacy cannot conflict with the facts of ph^^siology
and behaviorism. "^2 "Mind," he asserts, "has become attached
to the organism, absorbed by it, in some sense spatial, "^'^
and "a character of the neural s^/stem in action. "^"^^ "The
emergent evolutionist, with his belief in the significance
of organization, regards thinking as a nervous operation. "^^
Sellars' conception of mind is well summarized in this pas-
sage:
The 'under-the-hat' theory of mind, as it is deri
sively called by both idealists and Cartesian
88. Sellars, EF, 323.
89. Sellars, PPR, 408, ^22.
90. Ibid., ^24.
91. Sellars, art.(193G).
92. Sellars, PPP, 382.
93. Sellars, PPR, ^11.
94. Sellars, EW, 311.
95. Sellars, PER, ^29.
I
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dualists, makes mind local, emergent, physical,
and conscions.^^
It thus appears that, on the one hand, vSellars often
seems on the threshold of idealism. Re himself says, "I
would not be understood as refusing to recognize the truth
of much of that for which idealism stood in opposition to
the older naturalism."^''' So marked is Sellars' stress upon
the creativity and effective energy of mind, that Pratt
comments that he, Sellars, seems to have overthrovm his ovm
naturalism. On the other hand, Sellars nullifies the ide-
alism in his thought, for all interpretations are 'Vithin
the fr-^mev/ork of naturalism:" consciousness is an "event"
in the physical system; mind is "a character of the neural
system" and "a physical categorj'-*" and thinking is a "ner-
vous operation,"
All in all, these recent naturalists have made a sig-
nal departure from the atomistic view of mind held by the
traditional materialists. In the works of modern natural-
ists, there is rather generally a recognition of mind as
an entity stubbornly distinct from body in the obvious
sense--so persi.^-tently distinctive in its manifestations
that naturalists are constrained to devote considerable
9^, Sellars, E]\r, 316.
97, Ibid ., 19.
98. Pratt, art. (1936),
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attention to en attempted explanation within the restric-
tions of the scientific method. There is discussion
of rea-
son, conscioiv^ness, conation, and rational and moral judg-
ments. Sellars, particularly, seems to advance beyond the
older materialism in his affirmation of the unicueness, cre-
ative activity, and efficacy of mind. In this conception,
Sellsrs is at one with the idealists: and all naturalists,
in harmony with the idealists, explain raind as activity.
But at this point the systems diverge. Idealism believes
that the activity originates in the Mind of God. Natural-
ism believes that the activity is inherent in a self-suffi-
cient matter, the key to their viev/ being the evolution the-
ory. Evolution is the catalyst v/hich dissolves for them the
most stubborn stumbling-block of all materialism: the imme-
diately experienced and incomparably unioue character of
thought and will. Pjnd. so, after e detour in the direction
of idealism, these naturalists return to an essentially
physical explanation: "mind or purposiveness or any other
event or ouality ere explained in the same v/ay ... as cy-
clones or northern lights, "^^ Pratt's comment anent Sel-
lars discussions seems pertinent to the naturalistic viev/
99. Lamprecht, art. (19-^4)'
4
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as a whole. He says that Sellars has done nothing
to help Katerielism out of its old dilemma of
being forced either to identif;^^ consciousness
with the brain or to deny its efficacy, . . .
Professor Sellars is imwilling to commit him-
self to either of these difficulties, and ends
by falling a victim to both, 100
Yet, all this being so, there is, in recent naturalistic
thought, an unmistakable departure from the older materi-
alism and a suggestion of idealism. Mind is no longer de-
nied save as the motion of discrete atoms. Naturalists
recognize mind, and they recognize it as activity.
5. Naturalistic Treatment of the Idealistic Viev; of Value
i. Idealistic Viev/ of Value
Value, the good, is what is regarded as desirable, "By
a value (or worth, or good) is meant whatever is desired, or
enjoyed, or prized, or approved, or preferred, "-^01 Macken-
zie's definition runs similarly: "V-Tien we value anything,
we generally like it; we are pleased by its presence and
more or less pained by its absence. "-^02 Hocking says that
"Our actions drive incessantly to their ends, and these
101. Brightman, ITP, 126
102. Mackenzie, UV, 126.
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ends we call values. "103 value If what is sought because
It IS deemea good, and is thus the mainspring of man's ac-
tivities. As the focal drive of man's life, it has neces-
sarily occupied an important place in man's thoughts since
the da^^^n of philosophy: "Ever since man began to think he
has been concerned about the Question, '.Vhat is truly good
or valuable? "10^
The nuestion of the origin of value has been a perenni-
al subject of philosophic discussion. Brightman says;
Thinkers who agree on many points, disagree about
this fundamental ouestion. Are values simply and
solely relative to human desires and pleasures,
customs and institutions; or ere they in some way
permanent, objective aspects of the universe?105
The latter hypothesis has been the idealistic view ever since
Plato phrased his concept of the Good. Plato taught that
human values are reflections of an ideal order of perfect
f orm.s or patterns v/hich exist in heaven, the Supreme Idea
being the Idea of the Good:
You will agree that the Sun not only makes the
things we see visible, but also brings them in-
to existence and gives them grov/th and nourish-
ment: yet he is not the same thing as existence.
And so with the objects of knowledge; these de-
rive from the Good not only their pov/er of being
103. FockinfT, MGPTE,125.
10^. Bri.PThtman, I^P, 139.
105. Ibid., lAo,
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known but their very being and reality; and Good-
ness is not the same thing as being but even be-
vond being, surpassing it in dignity and power. -"-^
In the Laws, Plato says: "It is God who is, for you end me,
of a truth the 'measure of all things,.' much more truly
than, as they say, 'man.'"^^'^ goodness and all things ov/e
their existence to God,-^'-^^
All idealism places the rootage of value above and be-
yond the realm of m^n, Parker puts it thus:
According to the Platonic-Christian tradition,
which constitutes the intellectual framework of
our civilization, the authority of the ethical
rests on a basig, if not supernatural, at least
trans c endent . -"-^ ^
Brightman says: "Only for persons can ideals, obligations,
values, be reals "HC> ^^^^ "the ob.-lectivitv of values would
then mean their existence as purposes of the Divine ''find."-'-H
Bertoccl upholds the theory that
'vTiat is called purposeless harmony in the world
is of such a nature that it is most adeouately
interpreted as the display of a Mind capable of
grander rational themes and moral-aesthetic aims
than is the finite fighter for ends.H^
106. Plato, Eeo., VI, 509B.
107. Plato, Laws, IV, 716C.
108. Ibid., IV, 597B.
109. Parker, HU, 3.
110. Brightman, ITP, 125.
111. Ibid.. 169. '
112. Bertocci, art. (19^7).
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Sorley regards Vre moral order "as the order of a Sup
reme Mind and the ideal of goodness as belonging to this
Mind," -^^^ He says:
^ATierever there is intrinsic worth in the world,
there also, as well as in moral goodness, v/e see
a manifestation of the Divine, God mu.st there-
fore be conceived as the final home of values, the
Supreme Worth--as possessing the fulness of knowl-
edge and beauty and goodness and whatever else is
of value for its ovm sake.H^
The idealistic viev.^ of value as originating in the Mind
of God implies several specific aspects of value. For the
idealist, values are absolute, permanent, and eternal, and
their objectivity resides not only in their origin but also
in their validity:
""Tiat an objective value is one that all minds
that think reasonably ought to acknowledge (logi-
cal objectivity); and that it is valid not only
for human individuals and groups, but for the
universe, the reality on which man depends and
in harraonv with which he lives (metaphysical ob-jectivity) .•'"'^
Also, in idealism, values form a system which com-
prises all values, and is itself the supreme value. Sor-
ley asserts, "If we are to compare values at all, we must
give up the idea of a scale for that of a system, "^^^ and,
113. Sorley, TWIG, 353.
11^. Ibid
., 51.
115. Brip-htman, ITP, 160.
116. Sorley, ibid., 53.
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similarly, Brightman state.s, "Wo value has sovereignty in
its rational territory; only the league of values is sovep-
eign."ll'7
The idealist believes that the innumerable evidences
of value point to an intelligent arrangement involving pur-
pose and plan of which only Mind is capable. He holds that
values such as duty, beauty, and love constitute powerful
inspirations v;hich could stem only from an infinite Source
TBTfiifih bestovrs them, in feebler degrees, upon the finite
mind. Hence, the idealist concludes that values are the
purposes of the Supreme T'lind, that these Divine purposes
can never be completely comprehended by man, but that man
is able to discover them progressively and to establish them
as norms of his actions.
Wind elband
.
sets forth the idealistic point of viev/ ad-
mirably:
Ethical and aesthetic .judgments display, in the
mind of an unpreiudiced observer, an extremely
great diversity when one surveys the various peo-
ples of the earth in succession. Here again, how-
ever, we try to set up e final standard of values;
we speak of higher and lower standards of morality
or of taste in different peoples and different
acres. "Jhere do we get the standard for this judg-
ment? And where is the mind for which these ulti-
mate criteria are the values? If it is quite in-
evitable to rise above relativity in individual
117. Brightman, FOR, 101.
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appreciations and the rnorals of various peoples
to some standard of absolute values, it seems nec-
essary to pass bejz-ond the historical manifestations
of the entire human mind to some normal conscious-
ness for which these absolute values are values. -^^^
ii. Value in Traditional Tflaterialism
Traditional materialism, regarding mind as a temporary
grouping of atoms in motion, looks upon value as a tempo-
rary, humanly devised concept. Inasmuch as the analytic
m.ethod reduces human experience to an aggregate of extended
discrete particles, value is interpreted as the "special
movements of the particles or internal movements; "-^-^^ it
is a material entity, "^^^
Beginning with Democritus, who tftugjht that the highest
good is a perpetually joyous disposition, the attainment of
which demands wise discrimination among pleasures, all mate-
rialists have held that value is subjective. In this view,
value is strictly relative to the human situation; it exists
only as man can find or make it.-^^^ The mechanistic materi-
al universe has come about through the blind motion of mat-
ter, and, having no Personal Cause, it is not capable of re-
alizing ends or purposes or values. It is a "vain dream"
lis. V/indelband, I^P, 215.
119. Edel, art. (1944).
120. Brightman, ITP, 205-206.
121. Ibid., 207.

to imagine that veluep are objective, absolute, eternal,
or universal.
iii. Value in Hecent Natura.lism
Becent naturalism frankly traces its theory of value
to "the history of materialism from Democritus through
Hobbes and the French materialists to the Marxian school."
To this bactoound have been added "the evolutionary ethi-
cal theory" and the "stubborn empiricism of much of the
Utilitarian structure," culminating to a large degree in
the ethical theory of John Dewey. -^^
In the naturalistic investigation of value, the empha-
sis is upon the extension of the empirical or scientific
method.. The approach of naturalism involves
designation of the empirical material with v/hich
ethics is concerned, and continual testing of the
utility of ethicel formulations in terms of this
material. Insistence on such testing is part of
the naturalistic stress on the prima 03^ of matter;
recognition that ethical formulations may require
alteration is a consequence of noting the perva-
siveness of change. Reliance upon scientific meth-
od, together v/ith an appreciation of the primacy
of matter, I take to be the central points of natu-
ralism as a philosophic outlook.-^
122, Sdel, art. (19^4).
123. Ibid.
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In this pessapre, Edel emphasizes "utility in terras of em-
pirical material" and lack of permancy of "ethical formu-
lations ,
"
NaturaliFts believe that the ambiguity in ethical terms
may be abrogaterf by the unlimited application of their meth-
od, "Feeling is declared to be a kind of interior movement,"
and a "desire
. . .
is translated into the language of phy-
sics," leading to the deduction of "the generalizations of
ethics
. . . from physical laws,"-^^^ Choice is an "event in
nature, complex indeed," but grounded in the environment. ^
Value finds it source "somewhere in the domain of human
activity. "12^
Naturalists recopTiize no ultimate values in the ideal-
istic intery^retation. For naturalism, ultimate values
sre simply intense or pervasive attitudes of men
in a natural or social world functioning in a spe-
cial way with relation to other values. ... In
the light of varying vplues--arising out of indi-
vidual and social change- -thej?- may be accepted or
rejected. .... In recognizing that they function
as ultimate in the lives of specific individuals
or groups, naturalistic ethics does not give them
an intuitive or transcendental status.
12^. Edel, art.fl9^^'^).
125. Ibid.
126. Ibi^.
127. Ibid.
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In this vievv', a value is ultimate only in the sense that
it seems the most desirable object for "specific individu-
als or groups" in a specific situation; hence, the ultimat e
value may change momentarily. These naturalists insist that
"there is no absolute terminal value;
. , . terminal values
are always related to specific contexts. "-^ "^
For the modern naturalist there are no distinctively
ethical statements. Values and disvalues are defined
as the objects of love and hate. ... No object
could be intrinsically valuable, since any object
can be either loved or hated, or neither loved nor
hated. 130
According to this v/riter, the so-called "validity" of value
revealed upon analysis to be nothing more than a matter of
relationships "to other stretches of existence, including
various human actions," which, in themselves, are neutral
so far as value is concerned. 131
Edman expresses a similar view. Value, he says, con-
sists in "the fulfillment of desires and capacities: reali-
zation," and the summum bonum
generally turns out to be simply the current
128. Hook, art. (1944).
129. Edel, art. (1944).
130. Dennes, art.(194A),
131. Ibid
.

144
social and economic prepossessions of en influ-
ential class, local cliches, v/ritten, as it were,
across the sky. The highest good has a strsnge
v/ay of changing from generation to genera tion.^*^*^
John ^>evjey^ in Theory and Valuation , analyzes value as
strictly utilitarian. He asserts that "Value-propositions
of the distinctive sort arise whenever things are appraised
TOO
es to their suitebility and serviceability.." He says
that valuations "are constant phenomena of human behavior"
and are to be investigated in the light of "physical rela-
tions."-'-^^ His conclusion is that valuation consists in
the coordination of tv7o sources of energy: the energy of
the environment end the energy of the organism, "the two
kinds of energy being theoretically (if not as yet com-
pletely so in practice) capable of statement in terms of
physical units. "1^5
In the ICrikorian volume, Dewey affirms a naturalistic
code of morals and calls idealists to account for what he
styles a misinterpretation of his view. Then he goes on
to state:
The idea that unless standards and rules are ab-
solute, and hence eternal and immutable, they are
not rules and criteria at all is childish. If
132. Edman, FVP, 290-291.
133. Dewev, T^/", 51.
134. Ibid., 57.
135. Ibid., 53.
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there is anythinp- confirmed by observation it is
that human beings . . . naturally institute values,
Havinp- desires and having to giaide their conduct
hy aims and ixirposes, nothing else is possible.
But it is likeviise an abundantly confirmed fact
that stendards and ends which are nor influential
grev/ up and obtained their effectiveness over hu-
man behavior in all sorts of relatively accidental
ways particularly under conditions of geographical
isolation, social segregation, and absence of sci-
entific method. It recuires a good deal of pessi-
mism to assume that vastlj'' improved knowledge of
nature, human nature included, . • , v/ill not be
employed to render human relationshix^s more humane,
just, and liberal,
This statement epitomizes the recent naturalists' theory of
value: value is not absolute nor eternal nor permanent; it
is instituted by human beings under the influence of envi-
ronment; it v<rill probably change for the better through in-
creasing application of the scientific method to the study
of nature, and the impiroved character of value will prob-
ably manifest itself in better human relationships,
Faturalistic ethical theory has developed concomitant-
ly v/ith the sciences. Formerly, value was interpreted "on
a physical analogy as special movements of the particles or
internal movements," v/ith the development of the Darwinian
evolution theory, value came to be explained largely in
terms of biology. Later, the recognition of "the causal
13^, Dewey, art.(194^).
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role of social factors" opened e voider vista, and natural-
ists tend now to emphasize the social locale of value. Na-
turalistic ethics "insists upon a continuous testing of
goals in the light of their social functioning," on the
view of value as rooted in "the practices and institutions
of a society" ^'hich is constantly changing^ and it seeks
to fashion "a whole conception of good men functioning in
a good society, "^'^'''
Recent naturalism and traditional materialism both
hold a view of value fundamentally at variance v/ith the
idealistic concept. Both regard value as relative, teiapo-
rary, and of human origin. Yet the two views are not iden-
tical, ''lodern naturalism is an advance toward idealism in
ascribing the source of value to activity instead of to
solid particles, and also in the recognition of such ideals
as social justice and humanity.
In Sellars* system, particularly, an idealistic tenor
is discernible, Sellars defines value as "anything which
we desire, need, want, enjoy either for its own sake or as
a means. "•^'^^ He sees value as a pivotal force in the life
of man: "That value is central to human living, we soon
137. Sdel, art. (19^^).
138. Sellars, PP^, ^3^.
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realize when we gresp the fact thet values are objects val-
ued. "-^^^ He conf^iders that values form a hierarchy, the
bodily/ values as the lowest, and the religious, moral, and
intellectual values as the highest .-^"^^ Thus f8r--with the
single exception thPt in idealism religion is accorded the
highest place—Sellars* view is idealistic.
Also, he seems at times to regard value as objective.
Re says, "I shall n^self take as objective a. viev/ of v£lue
as possible. "^'^"^ ""oreover, he suggests that value is of
cosmic rootage and not merely relative to the human situa-
tion: "It is obvious," he says, "that I hold that value
judgments do and must fit into the cosmos. "-^^^ He denies
relativism and subjectivism:
I am going to stress the cniestion of factualism in
the theory of value because it seems to me basic.
Its implications are expressed in the old tag that
there is no disputing about tastes. Tastes are ul-
timate facts to be recognized as such.
. . .
The
inadequacy of ethical and 6 esthetic relativism, or
subjectivism, has been that it has left us with
brute facts without possibility of revision through
discussion and investigation. ... It presupposes
a dogm.rtic attitude of finality. . . . The factual-
ist is a dogmrtist,
. , , The real difference between
him and the authoritsrisn is that the latter is in
power. In neither is there the willingness to appea!|.
to reason and experience and open up questions for
more developed response. ^^^^
139. Cellars, PPP, ^35.
MO. Ibid
., '^a?.
1^1. Sell-rs, Pm, ^^5.
1^2. Eellars, EK, 3^2.
1^3. Sellars, PPPx, ^51.
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In several respects, then, Sellers sugo'ests 5 rejec-
tion of the naturalistic conception of value and an affir-
mation of the idealistic view. "Tnis tendency appears in
the importance he accords to value in human living', in his
formulation of a hierarchy of values, in his explicit ref-
erence to the objectivity of value, in his denial of rela-
tivism and subjectivism, and in his assertion that value
is organic to the cosmos.
However, Eellars* works afford passages which serve
to counteract completely this impression of an idealistic
conclusion, '^here are passages, such as the follov/ing, in
which he locates value v/ithin the limitations of the human
realm, m.aking it subjective and relative. He says:
The ultimate rational sanction of morality is the
fact that it is grounded in the nature of man. He
who is social and selective in his valuations is
by that very fac+ a moral agent. It springs out of
and cannot be removed from, intelligent human living,
, . . The gist of our conclusion, then, is that mo-
rality and its categories are intrinsic to that lev-
el of nature v/hich we call human living. 144
He asserts that "there is no one universal summum bonum . " On
the contrary, the best and most satisfying glimpses of life
are found in the "s^.Tnpathetic delineations of human living"
1^4. Sellers, PPP, ^26,
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by the best authors.l'^^ However, Sellars doevS not incuire
regarding the fountain-he&d of the annthors' inspiration. He
sees "no reason to assume transcendent absolute values," for
8 "more adecuate basis" is to be found, "in the emergence of
well-informed and sensitive persons. "-^"^^ As previously men-
tioned, Sellars regards man as a part "of the fabric" o£ an
all-inclusive physical nature, which he holds to be utterly
s elf-suffic ient
:
Let me fr?nkly say that I cannot—with the best
desire in the world--see adecuate grounds for the
assumption that physical svstems are not self-suf-
fflcient..-^-^'^
In his final conclusions, therefore, Sellars agrees
wi*h naturalists in g*enerc-l and vvith the traditional mate-
rialists in rejectinp- the essential features of the ideal-
istic view of value. Value is not objective, nor absolute,
nor eternal, nor universal, nor in any sense transcendent
nor supernatural, PTowever, in recent naturalism and par-
ticular 3.y in Sellars* thought, there are certain tendencies
tovrard the ideelistic conception. This trend is marked hy
the naturalistic belief in activity as basic, and also in
stress upon social justice. In Sellars' view, there is a
1^5. Sellars, PFP, ^08,
1^6. Ibid., ^.57-^58.
147. Ibid ., ^^6.
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further liberality apparent in his discussion of the ob-
jectivity of value, and in his intimations that value is
of cosmic significance.
TTevertheless, modern naturalists are still closely al-
lied to the materialistic position, and they cannot but re-
main so Virhile they adhere to their basic tenet regarding
method. As long as they bind themselves by the restric-
tions of the scientific method, they will be limited to a
materialistic explanation, barring themselves from the more
coherent idealistic hypothesis that all being has its
source in the energizing of the Divine Mind of God.

S U M M A R Y
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The introductory chapter of this dissertation v^as de-
voted to a consideration of preliminary matters. The chap-
ter opened with a quotation from 0. K. Chesterton indicat-
ing the practical importance in everyday living of the philo-
sophical view-point maintained. It vras pointed out that
the present tragic v;orld situation is the result of the con-
flict betv/een idealistic and materialistic ideologies. Un-
til the beginning of the twentieth century, the rift be-
tween the two systems was crystal clear: materialism was the
denial of idealism, 'bdern science, however, has given rise
to certain idealistic tendencies in recent naturalism. An
investigation of these tendencies is the purpose of this
study.
There followed, in Chapter I, a survey of the litera-
ture used as source material. This included naturalistic
and idealistic authors. John Bewey, as the central figure
in modern naturalism, received particular comment. His world-
wide influence v/as touched upon, and some opinions regarding
his thought were presented.
In Chapter II, the main traits of traditional material-
ism and of traditional idealism v/ere set forth. The discus-
sion included a brief account of the history of each sys-
tem, the definition of each, and a statement of the main
traits of each. Idealism was defined as the theory that
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nltim-te reality If of the nntm^e of 'nir/^. or coriccioufi-
neep, ar>f1 thet values fire ob.iective; and the ranln treite
of dr'epliPTi were llpte<1 es: <1) the e^moptlc method; (2)
the holistic goal of a coherent interpret etion of all of
experience; (3"^ the belief that belrr Is activity; (4) the
belief th?t minr' Ip the nltlmrte explprie+l-^n of the uni-
verFe; (5) the belief in comic piirpopp* (t^' the objecti-
vity of vnlue,
•%terlalipm was defines ee the theory thet the ulti-
mate explanation le to be found in natter (md. ite lawF;and
the mr:in tr^itF of mf^t erir. 11 rro were piven as: (1) the ana-
lytic method; (2) reFtriction to seneible dete; (?) etom-
lem; (^) the iTl+imate realitjr is matter; (6) mechanlFm and
the rejection of the rnpematurFl; (6) subject Ivity of
value
.
In Cbeptei' ITT, the main traits of recent naturallBtn
were reviev/ed. Consideration was firat centered upon the
definition of the terna nature
^
naturft] iBVU f and eupernatu-
rallBin . It wae shovn that, despite ^'apuenese and ambigui-
ty Furrounding theae worda, nevertheleFs both hlatorlcal
and general uaa^re sustain clear precise meenln^rs for them.
Tn recofmized urape, it appeared thet nature derignates
a part of reality, the world of sense objects In spac* and
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time; that supernaturalism is the doctrine which refers the
world, including man, to a being whose nature and power
transcend the natural world; and that naturalism is the
doctrine v.hich expands the conceptions of the natural sci-
ences into a v;orld-view, denying the reality of the super-
natural, spiritual, and transcendental. The naturalists a-
gree to the penerall^;- accepted definition of naturalism ,
but they define nature as all of reality, homogeneous through-
out" and amenable in all its parts, including man, to the
methods of the natural sciences; it follows that they deny
the existence of anything beyond sensory nature: there is
no sui ernatural.
The chapter continBet? vrith an investigation of the char-
acteristic features of recent naturalism, and a comparison of
recent naturalism with traditional materialism. The char-
acteristic features v/ere found to be threefold: (1) the crux
of naturalism is the fundamental dogma of the sole and ex-
clusive validity of the scientific miethod, which is restricted
to sensory objects; (2) the doctrine of rejection, which is
the denial of all supersensible existence; (3) a certain stress
among naturalists upon the agreements and divisions in their
thought: the agreements were shown to be fundamental and
determinative, as the faith in the scientific method as the
only clue to reality and the correlative rejection of all
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supersensory reelity; the divisions emerged as relatively
superficial and "within the framev/ork of naturalism," for
example, the two different approaches to scientific knowl-
edge emploj'-ed, respectively, by the structuralists and the
funct i onalists.
The comparison of naturalism v/ith the older material-
ism brought to light two main points of departure and three
salient points of identity. The points of departure, based
upon current scientific conceptions, were noted as: (1) Mat-
ter is now conceived as ultimately composed of centers of
active energy and not as hard, indestructible, discrete a-
toms; on this basis, the new basic categories of events,
oualities, and relations have replaced the outmoded cate-
gories of extended atoms, energy, and motion. An event is
"anything which haDpens," and designates a set "of occur-
rences whicTJ) are visible or audible or otherwise sensible."
(2) Recent naturalism is marked by a changed concept of
the scientific method. Naturalists now insist upon the
extension of their method, 'Adthout reservation, to every
area, including such realms as m.ind and value formerly
closed to scientific investigation, because they they be-
lieve that the new categories permit an adequate analysis
of "any oualities experienced or imao-inable, " Also, mod-
ern naturalists stress the function of reason in their method.
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Naturalism and traditional materialism were revealed
as identical in their fundamental tenets: (1) Both vvrhole-
heartedly indorse the scientific method as the only reliable
way of reaching truth, and both understand the scientific
method as restricted to sensory data, (2) Both believe in
the primacy of matter. (3) Both regard nature as a self-
sufficient process, requiring no supernatural explanation.
Chapter IV is focused upon the naturalistic treatment
of idealistic viev-rs, (1) There sre in recent naturalism
discernible tendencies tov^ard the E3nioptic method of ide-
alism. These tendencies appear in the urge toward inclu-
siveness in the naturalistic attempt at the uSilimited ex-
tension of their method, and in the admission of the wide
uses of reason, Hov/ever, the method, of naturalism remains
predominantly analytic, althoue-h not exclusively so.
(2) The holistic goal of idealism seems also to be
the goal of naturalism. The naturalistic aim is the ex-
planation of the vtiole universe, inclusive of man in all
his aspec+s, mental, moral, and physical, and the cate-
gory of event, as "anything which happens," seems to lend
itself to this end.
(3) The idealistic conception of being as activity
is also a belief of recent naturalism. Hov/ever , idealists
regard the ultimate reality as mental activity, while
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naturalists believe that it is somehow inherent in matter
v;ith no trenscendental cause.
(4) The idealistic concept of mind as basic to reality
is not accepted in naturalistic thought, I^evertheless, re-
cent naturalism marks a signal advance over the traditional
materialistic view. ^'^.±n6 is no longer denied except as a
complex of eto:riS in motion. Naturalists recognize mind
and thev recofrnize it as activitv.
(5) The idealistic belief that value is an eternal ob-
jective aspect of the universe is essentially at variance
vrith the naturalistic view that value is relative to the
human v^ituation. '^'^et, in naturalistic discussion, ther'fe
appear bints of an idealistic trend in a liberal attitude
toward the objectivity of value, and in stress upon social
justice.
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1. Until the tweritieth centijry, idealism and materi-
alism, for the most part, maintained antipodal positions
on all important philosophical issues. Eecent naturalism,
influenced by current scientific developments, manifests
some tendencies towsrd idealistic views,
2, Specifically, tine tradixlonal coniiiCL Dexv/een the
tv^-o sys-cems centered upon tne follovring feaiures: the sy-
nopx-ic method of idealism was opposed by the analytic meth-
od of materialisKi; holism was contrasted with atomism: be-
ing as ohe activity of mind stood in contradistinction to
being as the motion of atoms; mind as the ultimate real-
ity was in opposition to matter as the ultimate reality;
and the objectifity of value conflicted with the subjec-
tivity of value,
3, Ambiguity and obscurity surround the meaning of the
term nature
. In defining nature as all that there is, natu-
ralists contribute nothing toward resolving the confusion.
Recognized authorities and general usage construe nature
as denoting physical reality; it seems wiser to retain this
clear and specific meaning which has been preserved, ralJier
thaJi to make nature a synonym for all,
4. In the naturalistic view, nature is the totality
of reality inclusive of man in all his aspects, mental, mor-
al, and physical; it is a self-sufficient, self-developing
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system with no supernatural nor transcendental sanctions;
it is homogeneous throughout its structure, and in all its
parts it is amenable to investigation by the physical or
natural sciences,
5. The crux of recent naturalistic philosophy is the
belief in the sole and exclusive validity of the scienti-
fic method which is restricted to sensory data. Conse-
quently, naturalists deny all supersensible existence; they
reject everything known as supernatural, spiritijal, and
transcendental; and they disavov^ the existence of God, the
doctrine of immortality, and the reality of soul or mind
save as a physical category,
6. In numerous points, recent naturalism and tradi-
tional materialism are identical: both indorse the exclu-
sive validity of the scientific method: both affirm the
primacy of matter: and both assert the self-sufficiency of
natui-e. Recent natui^alistic thought, in recognition of the
current scientific conception of matter as ultimately con-
sisting of fields of force not unlike electficity, departs
significantly from traditional materialism: The recent
shift from the former categories of extended atoms, energy,
and motion to the new basic categories of events, qualities,
and relations marks an important advance. An event is
"anything which happens" and designates a set "of occurrences
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which are visible or audible or otherwise sensible," Natu-
ralists believe that the new categories permit the unlim-
ited extension of their method, which, they hold, provides
an adequate analysis of "any qualities experienced or im-
aginable."
7. Recent naturalistic thought is characterized by
tendencies toward the views of traditional idealism, in
several essential aspects. The current scientific meth-
od, in its departure from the limitations of strict analy-
sis and in its emphasis upon reason and reflection, tends
toward the synoptic method of idealism,
8. Secondly, idealistic holism has become the goal of
recent naturalists in their attempt to explain the whole
universe, specifically inclusive of the mental and moral
aspects of man, which were unintelligible in the mecha-
nistic theory.
9. In the third place, the most significant and fun-
damental advance toward idealism consists in the concur-
rence of recent naturalists in the traditional idealistic
view that being is activity,
10. A fourth indication of the idealistic trend in
naturalistic philosophy is the recognition, among natural-
ists in general, of the unique qualities of mind, and
their earnest attempts at explanation; and, in Sellars in
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particular, the assertion of the creative activity and
efficacy of mind,
11. Finally, in naturalistic discussion of value there
is a trend toward idealism in the emphasis upon social ^ius-
tice, and in a liberal attitude toward the idealistic be-
lief in the objectivity of value.
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Until the twentieth century, idealism and materialism
stood in full opposition on all important philosophical
issues. Recent naturalism, influenced by current scienti-
fic developments, manifests some tendencies toward ideal-
istic views, The problem of this dissertation is the in-
vestigation of these tendencies.
The main traits of traditional idealism constitute a
point-by-point antithesis to those of traditional materi-
alism. The synoptic method of idealism was in contrast to
the analytic method of materialism. Holism opposed atom-
ism. Being as the activity of mind stood connterpoised to
being as the motion of discrete atoms. Mind as the ulti-
mate reality was in conflict with matter as the ultimate
reality. Value as objective and eternal ran counter to
value as subjective and relative. The two systems were in
stark contradiction, the one an unqualified denial of the
other. The rigidity of the older materialistic position
seems less inflexible at certain points in modern natural-
istic thought.
The crux of recent naturalistic philosophy is the fun-
damental dogma of the sole and exclusive validity of the
scientific method as the avenue to truth and knowledge;
there is no reality except that revealed by the methods of
the physical or natural sciences. This initial restriction
J
to sensory data Is "the framework of naturalism* " It is
the nuclear cell from which derive all naturalistic tenets.
It determines the belief that all reality consists of sen-
sible objects, and hence, the view of nature as the totali-
ty of reality, homogeneous in character and identical in
structure and operation in all its parts. Herein resides
the necessity for the naturalistic doctrines of rejection,
regarded by Dennes as the mark of "distinction from other
philosophical posltioas;" naturalists deny all supersen-
sible existence; they repudiate everything known as super-
natural, spiritual, or transcendental; they disavow the ex-
istence of God, the reality of soul or mind save as a phy-
sical category, and the doctrine of immortality. In the
basic and determinative belief in the sole reliability of
the scientific method, as well as in the correlative views
of the primacy of the material and the rejection of the super-
natural, modern naturalism is at one with traditional mate-
rialism.
Recent naturalism, however, seeks to transcend materi-
alism. The distinction parallels the advance of science
from an outmoded nineteenth-century physics. In current
scientific theory, matter is not composed of Indestructible
particles; it is now believed to consist of fields of force,
centers of active energy, not unlike electricity. The

changed scientific concept of matter has entailed a re-
vision of some aspects of naturalistic philosophy.
In conformity with the changed concept of matter, natu-
ralism has made a "striking shift" from the former catego-
ries of extended matter, energy, and motion, to the new ba-
sic categories of events, qualities, and relations. These
categories are the ultimate constituents of all existence,
and they designate sets of sensible occurrences. The cate-
gories have no specific attribute with the single exception
of process. An event is "anything which happens." Natu-
ralists look upon the shift in categories as a mark of vi-
tal progress in their system, because the new categories,
they believe, enable them to Investigate adequately areas
of being, such as mind and value, which were unintelligible
in the older materialism. On this basis, naturalists admit
wide uses of reason, and insist with emphasis upon the uni-
versal application of their method.
The foregoing departures from the older materialistic
position are at the same time the foci of the tendencies
toward Idealism, and they are apparent, in varying degrees,
in the naturalistic treatment of the main traits of idealism.
The synoptic method of idealism is the method appropri-
ate to philosophy, for, as philosophy Includes all the sci-
ences, the synoptic method includes all other philosophical

methods and surpasses them. It is the only method which
takes into account all available information and applies
the light of reason toward the most coherent explanation
of the universe and man, realizing that wholes may possess
properties often lacking in their parts. The analytic meth-
od of traditional materialism dissected extended matter in-
to "billiard-ball" atoms, . and in terms of these, the uni-
verse was explained. The scientific method of recent natu-
ralism is still predominantly analytic, but not exclusive-
ly so. Sellars, for example, seeks coherence and synthesis.
The new categories render the method more flexible, inspir-
ing naturalists to devote thoughtful attention to aspects
of being,, such as moral, aesthetic, or logical concepts,
which, formerly, were ignored or denied. The insistence up-
on the unlimited extension is a straining toward the in-
clusiveness of sjmopsis. The importance of the rational pro-
cesses is stressed. Coherence, sjmthesis, inclusiveness,
and reason^e suggestions of] the method of idealism, c^^-.-^^.^^^f.^.X^i?,
Idealistic holism is the belief that the truth is the
whole; it is the doctrine that the essential nature is lo-
cated in the whole rather than in its constituent parts, that
a part may not be truly known in isolation, but only as it
ie completely known in its relations to the whole. , Antipodal

to thle view was the theory of materialistic atomism which
affirmed reality to be in the tiniest known particle. In
recent naturalism, there appears an urge toward holism in
the insistence upon the unlimited application of the sci-
entific method, and aleo in the emphasis upon the universe
in its totality y specifically inclusive of entities ignored
or denied in the older materialism.
In the idealistic view, the ultimate reality is the ac-
tivity of mind; all things and persons owe their existence
to the activity of the Mnd of God, In traditional materi-
alism, the ultimate reality was the discrete, granular atom.
In recent naturalism, ultimacy is located in the activity,
similar to electricity, somehow inherent in matter. Hence,
naturalists and idealists agree that being is activity, but
disagree regarding the initial source of the activity.
In idealistic thought, mind is the unique and basic re-
ality, liaterialism regarded mind as a complex of atoms in
motion. Naturalists regard mind as a novel entity, and de-
vote much discussion to cognition, conation, and conscious-
ness, Sellars emphasizes the creativity, the effective en-
ergy, and the uniqueness of mind,. In these views, natural-
ists approach idealism. But the naturalistic investigation
turns out to be "within the framework of naturalism;" mind
is the integrated action of the biological organism; Sellars

calls it a "physical category."
For idealism, value is objective, absolute, eternal,
and integral to the structure of the universe. Values are
the purposes of the Divine Mnd; they may be progressively,
but never completely, comprehended by the finite mind for
the establishment of norms of action. In traditional ma-
terialism, value* were explained as internal particles in
motion. The naturalistic theory of value is still far
removed from idealism. Value is within the realm of hu-
man activity and, upon analysis, may be expressed in terms
of the natural sciences. There is an advance beyond the
former view, however, in the emphasis upon the social lo-
cale of value and in the stress upon social justice. Sel-
lars, at times, discusses value in terms of objectivity and
cosmic rootage, but, in the end, he explicitly locates it
within the limitations of human living.
All in all, recent naturalism is essentially identical
with traditional materialism. By the dogma of method, both
restrict themselves at the outset to the recognition of on-
ly sensible data and hence are at once committed to mate-
rialistic conclusions, Nevertheless, "within the frame-
work," there has been a revolutionary change: the concep-
tion of reality as active energy not unlike electricity is
far removed from the "billiard-ball" atom theory. There

is significance in discarding a belief which has prevailed
for some twenty centuries. Already naturalistic thought
has embraced toia marked degree views formerly distinctive-
ly characteristic of idealism, auggesting a liberalism
among recent naturalists which portends further advances
toward idealistic beliefs.
CONCLUSIONS
1, Recent naturalists, influenced by current scientific
developments, are rather generally adopting views tradi-
tionally characteristic of idealists,
2, Traditionally, idealists and materialists have held
opposing views regarding method, holism, reality, mind,
and value,
3, Ambiguity and obscurity surround the meaning of the
term nature . It seems wise to retain the clear and specific
definition which construes nature ad denoting physical
reality,
4, In the naturalistic view, nature is all of reality
inclusive of man in all his aspects, mental, moral, and
physical; it is a self-sufficient, self-developing system

with no supernatural nor transcendental sanctions; it is
homogeneous tbroughout its structure, and in all its parts
susceptible to investigation by the physical or natural
sciences,
6. The crux of recent naturalistic philosophy is the
belief in the sole and exclusive validity of the scientific
method which is restricted to sensory data. Consequently,
naturalists deny all supersensible existence.
6, Recent naturalism and traditional materialism are
identical in their affirmation of the exclusive validity of
the scientific method, of the primacy of matter, Recent
naturalism departs significantly from materialism in the
establishment of the new basic categories of events, quali-
ties, and relations,
7, A notable trend toward idealism is found in the re-
cent nature list's conception of the scientific method. The
current scientific method, in its departure from the limita-
tions of strict analysis and in its emphasis upon reason and
reflection, tends toward the synoptic method of idealism,
3, Secondly, naturalists seek: the idealistic goal of
holism in their attempt to explain the whole universe, spe-
cifically inclusive of the mental and moral aspects of man,
which were unintelligible in the mechanistic theory,
9, Thirdly, naturalists have adopted the idealistic

view that being is activity,
10. Fourthly, naturalists in general have adopted the
idealifstic recognition of the unique qualities of mind, and
Sellars, in particular, asserts the creative activity and
efficacy of mind,
11. Finally, in naturalistic discussion of value, a
trend tov;ard idealism is apparent in the emphasis upon social
justice and in a liberal attitude the objectivity of value.
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